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From: Borislav Petkov <bp-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linuxppc-dev-uLR06cmDAlY/bJ5BZ2RsiQ@public.gmane.org,
	kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Piotr Luc <piotr.luc-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
	Reza Arbab
	<arbab-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Matt Fleming
	<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov"
	<kirill.shutemov-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel
	<ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Andrew Morton
	<akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>,
	Eric
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 07:45:22 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170725054522.GA21822@nazgul.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170724190757.11278-2-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>

On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:41PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:

Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
													 ^^^^^^^^^^

Please introduce a spellchecker into your workflow.

> Update amd-memory-encryption document describing the AMD Secure Encrypted

"Update the AMD memory encryption document...

The patch has the proper URL already.

> Virtualization (SEV) feature.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> ---
>  Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
> index f512ab7..747df07 100644
> --- a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
> @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
> -Secure Memory Encryption (SME) is a feature found on AMD processors.
> +Secure Memory Encryption (SME) and Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) are
> +features found on AMD processors.
>  
>  SME provides the ability to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted using
>  the standard x86 page tables.  A page that is marked encrypted will be
> @@ -6,6 +7,12 @@ automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and encrypted when written to
>  DRAM.  SME can therefore be used to protect the contents of DRAM from physical
>  attacks on the system.
>  
> +SEV enables running encrypted virtual machine (VMs) in which the code and data

					 machines

> +of the virtual machine are secured so that decrypted version is available only

... of the guest VM ...		  ... so that a decrypted ...

> +within the VM itself. SEV guest VMs have concept of private and shared memory.

				 	have *the* concept - you need to use
					definite and indefinite articles in your
					text.

> +Private memory is encrypted with the guest-specific key, while shared memory
> +may be encrypted with hypervisor key.

And here you explain that the hypervisor key is the same key which we
use in SME. So that people can make the connection.

> +
>  A page is encrypted when a page table entry has the encryption bit set (see
>  below on how to determine its position).  The encryption bit can also be
>  specified in the cr3 register, allowing the PGD table to be encrypted. Each
> @@ -19,11 +26,20 @@ so that the PGD is encrypted, but not set the encryption bit in the PGD entry
>  for a PUD which results in the PUD pointed to by that entry to not be
>  encrypted.
>  
> -Support for SME can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The CPUID
> -function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
> +When SEV is enabled, certain type of memory (namely insruction pages and guest

When SEV is enabled, instruction pages and guest page tables are ...

> +page tables) are always treated as private. Due to security reasons all DMA

security reasons??

> +operations inside the guest must be performed on shared memory. Since the
> +memory encryption bit is only controllable by the guest OS when it is operating

		     ... is controlled ...

> +in 64-bit or 32-bit PAE mode, in all other modes the SEV hardware forces memory

								... forces the memory ...

> +encryption bit to 1.
> +
> +Support for SME and SEV can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The
> +CPUID function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
>  
>  	0x8000001f[eax]:
>  		Bit[0] indicates support for SME
> +	0x800001f[eax]:

There's a 0 missing and you don't really need it as it is already above.

> +		Bit[1] indicates support for SEV
>  	0x8000001f[ebx]:
>  		Bits[5:0]  pagetable bit number used to activate memory
>  			   encryption
> @@ -39,6 +55,13 @@ determine if SME is enabled and/or to enable memory encryption:
>  		Bit[23]   0 = memory encryption features are disabled
>  			  1 = memory encryption features are enabled
>  
> +If SEV is supported, MSR 0xc0010131 (MSR_F17H_SEV) can be used to determine if

If this MSR is going to be part of the architecture - and I really think
it is - then call it MSR_AMD64_SEV.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
-- 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-07-25  5:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
     [not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-1-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-2-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25  5:45       ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
     [not found]         ` <20170725054522.GA21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:59           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-6-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 16:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20170728152342.GB11564-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:55         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07  3:48     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <42cf82fc-03be-c4c7-eaab-b2306a049d20-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-25 12:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-18-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-31 15:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-3-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 10:26     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20170725102657.GD21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:29         ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]           ` <7236d267-ebcb-8b45-b8d3-5955903e395f-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:36             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17                       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17  8:12                         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-4-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26  4:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <facf3ac6-ebda-57a7-f961-6029b3ac7be7-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 13:39           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-8-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 14:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28  8:47       ` David Laight
     [not found]         ` <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD0045508-VkEWCZq2GCInGFn1LkZF6NBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:21           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-9-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-28 10:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31  8:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-12-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-02  4:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  9:51   ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
     [not found]       ` <CAK8P3a3h7JpmkW7W=HwqAuWWmro=ngj6HSeiiML_=T82x-FtZQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 19:24         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27  7:45               ` David Laight
     [not found]               ` <589d65a4-eb09-bae9-e8b4-a2d78ca6b509-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-22 16:52                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48                         ` Brijesh Singh
     [not found]                           ` <ad628a45-8e4e-9cfc-2cc4-33dc6bf4613a-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:22                             ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]                               ` <20170915162256.7l4vyy4ee5zeqbir-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:27                                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02  3:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]             ` <CALCETrV+rv=9Rg5V1z8vHtVDW64eCNtZHQMW8DipRADvm+qP5A-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-03  2:34               ` Brijesh Singh
     [not found]           ` <8155b5b2-b2b3-bc8f-33ae-b81b661a2e38-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-04 17:05             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47               ` Brijesh Singh

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