From: Borislav Petkov <bp-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linuxppc-dev-uLR06cmDAlY/bJ5BZ2RsiQ@public.gmane.org,
kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Piotr Luc <piotr.luc-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
Reza Arbab
<arbab-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>,
David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Matt Fleming
<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov"
<kirill.shutemov-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
Andrew Morton
<akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>,
Eric
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 15:39:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170727133927.GC28553@nazgul.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <facf3ac6-ebda-57a7-f961-6029b3ac7be7-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 11:47:32AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> If it's made static then the sme_active()/sev_active() inline functions
> would need to be turned into functions within the mem_encrypt.c file. So
> there's a trade-off to do that, which is the better one?
Simple: why do we have functions if the variables are exported?
The reasoning for sme_me_mask is more or less obvious but for sev_enabled...
IOW, either make the bool static and unlinine the function - this way
you're free to change how you determine whether SEV is enabled later as
callers will be using the function.
Or, if it doesn't really matter because you can always change callers
later, simply drop sev_active() the function and use a bool sev_active
everywhere.
> The kernel needs to distinguish between running under SME and running
> under SEV. SME and SEV are similar but not the same. The trampoline code
> is a good example. Before paging is activated, SME will access all
> memory as decrypted, but SEV will access all memory as encrypted. So
> when APs are being brought up under SME the trampoline area cannot be
> encrypted, whereas under SEV the trampoline area must be encrypted.
I guess you're sensing by now that we need this clarification in a
comment above it...
:-)
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-27 13:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-3-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170725102657.GD21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <7236d267-ebcb-8b45-b8d3-5955903e395f-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-4-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <facf3ac6-ebda-57a7-f961-6029b3ac7be7-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-1-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-2-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170725054522.GA21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-6-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170728152342.GB11564-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <42cf82fc-03be-c4c7-eaab-b2306a049d20-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-18-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-8-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight
[not found] ` <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD0045508-VkEWCZq2GCInGFn1LkZF6NBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-9-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-12-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45 ` Arnd Bergmann
[not found] ` <CAK8P3a3h7JpmkW7W=HwqAuWWmro=ngj6HSeiiML_=T82x-FtZQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 19:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight
[not found] ` <589d65a4-eb09-bae9-e8b4-a2d78ca6b509-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-22 16:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48 ` Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <ad628a45-8e4e-9cfc-2cc4-33dc6bf4613a-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:22 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170915162256.7l4vyy4ee5zeqbir-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrV+rv=9Rg5V1z8vHtVDW64eCNtZHQMW8DipRADvm+qP5A-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <8155b5b2-b2b3-bc8f-33ae-b81b661a2e38-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh
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