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From: Borislav Petkov <bp-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linuxppc-dev-uLR06cmDAlY/bJ5BZ2RsiQ@public.gmane.org,
	kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Piotr Luc <piotr.luc-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
	Reza Arbab
	<arbab-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Matt Fleming
	<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov"
	<kirill.shutemov-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel
	<ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Andrew Morton
	<akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>,
	Eric
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 12:31:52 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170728103152.GE1889@nazgul.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170724190757.11278-9-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>

On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:48PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> 
> EFI data is encrypted when the kernel is run under SEV. Update the
> page table references to be sure the EFI memory areas are accessed
> encrypted.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> index 12e8388..1ecb3f6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
>  #include <linux/reboot.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
>  
>  #include <asm/setup.h>
>  #include <asm/page.h>
> @@ -369,7 +370,10 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
>  	 * as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away
>  	 * from memory allocators anyway.
>  	 */
> -	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, _PAGE_RW)) {
> +	pf = _PAGE_RW;
> +	if (sev_active())
> +		pf |= _PAGE_ENC;

\n here

> +	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, pf)) {
>  		pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the first page!\n");
>  		return 1;
>  	}
> @@ -412,6 +416,9 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
>  	if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
>  		flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
>  
> +	if (sev_active())
> +		flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
> +
>  	pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>  	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, va, md->num_pages, flags))
>  		pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
> @@ -511,6 +518,9 @@ static int __init efi_update_mappings(efi_memory_desc_t *md, unsigned long pf)
>  	pgd_t *pgd = efi_pgd;
>  	int err1, err2;
>  
> +	if (sev_active())
> +		pf |= _PAGE_ENC;

Move this assignment to the caller efi_update_mem_attr() where pf is being
set...

> +
>  	/* Update the 1:1 mapping */
>  	pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>  	err1 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, md->num_pages, pf);
> @@ -589,6 +599,9 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
>  			(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
>  			pf |= _PAGE_RW;
>  
> +		if (sev_active())
> +			pf |= _PAGE_ENC;

... just like here.

> +
>  		efi_update_mappings(md, pf);

In general, I'm not totally excited about that sprinkling of if
(sev_active())... :-\

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
-- 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-07-28 10:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-3-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 10:26     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20170725102657.GD21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:29         ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]           ` <7236d267-ebcb-8b45-b8d3-5955903e395f-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:36             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17                       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17  8:12                         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-4-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26  4:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <facf3ac6-ebda-57a7-f961-6029b3ac7be7-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 13:39           ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-1-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-2-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25  5:45       ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]         ` <20170725054522.GA21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:59           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-6-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 16:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20170728152342.GB11564-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:55         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07  3:48     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <42cf82fc-03be-c4c7-eaab-b2306a049d20-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-25 12:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-18-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-31 15:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-8-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 14:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28  8:47       ` David Laight
     [not found]         ` <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD0045508-VkEWCZq2GCInGFn1LkZF6NBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:21           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-9-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-28 10:31     ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-08-17 18:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31  8:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-12-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-02  4:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  9:51   ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
     [not found]       ` <CAK8P3a3h7JpmkW7W=HwqAuWWmro=ngj6HSeiiML_=T82x-FtZQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 19:24         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27  7:45               ` David Laight
     [not found]               ` <589d65a4-eb09-bae9-e8b4-a2d78ca6b509-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-22 16:52                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48                         ` Brijesh Singh
     [not found]                           ` <ad628a45-8e4e-9cfc-2cc4-33dc6bf4613a-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:22                             ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]                               ` <20170915162256.7l4vyy4ee5zeqbir-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:27                                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02  3:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]             ` <CALCETrV+rv=9Rg5V1z8vHtVDW64eCNtZHQMW8DipRADvm+qP5A-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-03  2:34               ` Brijesh Singh
     [not found]           ` <8155b5b2-b2b3-bc8f-33ae-b81b661a2e38-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-04 17:05             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47               ` Brijesh Singh

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