From: Borislav Petkov <bp-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linuxppc-dev-uLR06cmDAlY/bJ5BZ2RsiQ@public.gmane.org,
kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Piotr Luc <piotr.luc-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
Reza Arbab
<arbab-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>,
David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Matt Fleming
<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov"
<kirill.shutemov-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
Andrew Morton
<akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>,
Eric
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2017 06:02:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170802040255.GA4336@nazgul.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170724190757.11278-12-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:51PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
>
> In order for memory pages to be properly mapped when SEV is active, we
> need to use the PAGE_KERNEL protection attribute as the base protection.
> This will insure that memory mapping of, e.g. ACPI tables, receives the
> proper mapping attributes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/ioport.h | 3 +++
> kernel/resource.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> index c0be7cf..7b27332 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -69,6 +69,26 @@ static int __ioremap_check_ram(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int __ioremap_res_desc_other(struct resource *res, void *arg)
> +{
> + return (res->desc != IORES_DESC_NONE);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * This function returns true if the target memory is marked as
> + * IORESOURCE_MEM and IORESOURCE_BUSY and described as other than
> + * IORES_DESC_NONE (e.g. IORES_DESC_ACPI_TABLES).
> + */
> +static bool __ioremap_check_if_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> + u64 start, end;
> +
> + start = (u64)addr;
> + end = start + size - 1;
> +
> + return (walk_mem_res(start, end, NULL, __ioremap_res_desc_other) == 1);
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Remap an arbitrary physical address space into the kernel virtual
> * address space. It transparently creates kernel huge I/O mapping when
> @@ -146,7 +166,15 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
> pcm = new_pcm;
> }
>
> + /*
> + * If the page being mapped is in memory and SEV is active then
> + * make sure the memory encryption attribute is enabled in the
> + * resulting mapping.
> + */
> prot = PAGE_KERNEL_IO;
> + if (sev_active() && __ioremap_check_if_mem(phys_addr, size))
> + prot = pgprot_encrypted(prot);
Hmm, so this function already does walk_system_ram_range() a bit
earlier and now on SEV systems we're going to do it again. Can we make
walk_system_ram_range() return a distinct value for SEV systems and act
accordingly in __ioremap_caller() instead of repeating the operation?
It looks to me like we could...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-02 4:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-1-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-2-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170725054522.GA21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-6-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170728152342.GB11564-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <42cf82fc-03be-c4c7-eaab-b2306a049d20-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-18-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-3-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170725102657.GD21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <7236d267-ebcb-8b45-b8d3-5955903e395f-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-4-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <facf3ac6-ebda-57a7-f961-6029b3ac7be7-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-8-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight
[not found] ` <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD0045508-VkEWCZq2GCInGFn1LkZF6NBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-9-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-12-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45 ` Arnd Bergmann
[not found] ` <CAK8P3a3h7JpmkW7W=HwqAuWWmro=ngj6HSeiiML_=T82x-FtZQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 19:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight
[not found] ` <589d65a4-eb09-bae9-e8b4-a2d78ca6b509-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-22 16:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48 ` Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <ad628a45-8e4e-9cfc-2cc4-33dc6bf4613a-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:22 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170915162256.7l4vyy4ee5zeqbir-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrV+rv=9Rg5V1z8vHtVDW64eCNtZHQMW8DipRADvm+qP5A-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <8155b5b2-b2b3-bc8f-33ae-b81b661a2e38-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh
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