From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-fs-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, "Lee,
Chun-Yi" <jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>,
Josh Boyer
<jwboyer-rxtnV0ftBwyoClj4AeEUq9i2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: load blacklist from MOKx
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 22:11:38 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171129141139.20088-4-jlee@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171129141139.20088-1-jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
This patch adds the logic to load the blacklisted hash and
certificates from MOKx which is maintained by shim bootloader.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer-rxtnV0ftBwyoClj4AeEUq9i2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
---
certs/load_uefi.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/certs/load_uefi.c b/certs/load_uefi.c
index f2f372b..dc66a79 100644
--- a/certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
{
efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
- void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
- unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
+ void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL, *mokx = NULL;
+ unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0, mokxsize = 0;
int rc = 0;
if (!efi.get_variable)
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
kfree(dbx);
}
- /* the MOK can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */
+ /* the MOK and MOKx can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
return 0;
@@ -208,6 +208,16 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
kfree(mok);
}
+ mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize);
+ if (mokx) {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:mokx",
+ mokx, mokxsize,
+ get_handler_for_dbx);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListXRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
+ kfree(mokx);
+ }
+
return rc;
}
late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
--
2.10.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-29 14:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-29 14:11 [PATCH 0/4] Using the hash in MOKx to blacklist kernel module Lee, Chun-Yi
2017-11-29 14:11 ` [PATCH 1/4] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled Lee, Chun-Yi
[not found] ` <20171129141139.20088-2-jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-30 15:51 ` James Bottomley
[not found] ` <1512057063.3020.11.camel-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk@public.gmane.org>
2017-12-01 6:59 ` joeyli
2017-11-29 14:11 ` [PATCH 2/4] MODSIGN: print appropriate status message when getting UEFI certificates list Lee, Chun-Yi
[not found] ` <20171129141139.20088-1-jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-29 14:11 ` Lee, Chun-Yi [this message]
2017-11-29 14:11 ` [PATCH 4/4] MODSIGN: checking the blacklisted hash before loading a kernel module Lee, Chun-Yi
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