From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Gary Lin Subject: Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 18:03:02 +0800 Message-ID: <20171208100302.an3bi3baewifcakc@GaryWorkstation> References: <20171205100148.5757-1-glin@suse.com> <20171207142657.52e1363a@alans-desktop> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20171207142657.52e1363a@alans-desktop> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=m.gmane.org@lists.infradead.org To: Alan Cox Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel , Matt Fleming , Catalin Marinas , x86@kernel.org, Will Deacon , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Joey Lee , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Dec 07, 2017 at 02:26:57PM +0000, Alan Cox wrote: > On Tue, 5 Dec 2017 18:01:46 +0800 > Gary Lin wrote: > > > The series of patches introduce Security Version to EFI stub. > > > > Security Version is a monotonically increasing number and designed to > > prevent the user from loading an insecure kernel accidentally. The > > bootloader maintains a list of security versions corresponding to > > different distributions. After fixing a critical vulnerability, the > > distribution kernel maintainer bumps the "version", and the bootloader > > updates the list automatically. > > This seems a mindbogglingly complicated way to implement something you > could do with a trivial script in the package that updates the list of > iffy kernels and when generating the new grub.conf puts them in a menu > of 'old insecure' kernels. > Ya, a menu for those kernels is also a kind of warning to the users. Thanks for pointing the direction. > Why do you even need this in the EFI stub ? > For 2 reasons. 1. We want the version number being unalterable. In a system with UEFI Secure Boot, the signature appended to the kernel guarantees that the version number is genuine. 2. For the cross-architecture support. Since the version number could be anywhere in the image file, we need at least a offset to point to the version number. That's why I choose the resource section/table in the EFI header. It exists as long as the EFI stub exists. The design of the directory allows different data stored separately. If there is a better place for the version number, I'd be glad to adopt it. > What happens if you want to invalidate an old kernel but not push a new > one ? Today if you've got a package that maintains the list of 'iffy' > kernels you can push a tiny package, under your scheme you've got to push > new kernels which is an un-necessary and high risk OS change. > The idea is that the security version only bumps only when it's really necessary. For example, the new kernel fixes a severe bug that invalidates the signature check of the modules. Or, the distro makes an official release and would like to obsolete the alpha/beta/RC kernel. Anyway, it depends on the distro policy. Actually, our main target is only for the enterprise server, and the kernel update path is relatively simple. Since it may bring some confusion in a multi-boot system, we are currently not planning to enable SV for the community distro, i.e. openSUSE. Thanks, Gary Lin