From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Borislav Petkov Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 19:58:56 +0100 Message-ID: <20180216185856.GE29042@pd.tnic> References: <20180215182208.35003-1-joe.konno@linux.intel.com> <20180216105548.GA29042@pd.tnic> <20180216110821.GB29042@pd.tnic> <20180216184832.sqreq5zhar3jqdae@jbkonno-saint14> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20180216184832.sqreq5zhar3jqdae@jbkonno-saint14> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Joe Konno Cc: Ard Biesheuvel , Matthew Garrett , Ingo Molnar , Andy Lutomirski , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List , Jeremy Kerr , Andi Kleen , Tony Luck , Benjamin Drung , Peter Jones List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 10:48:32AM -0800, Joe Konno wrote: > We may see some other patches or RFCs about caching and/or shadowing > variable values in efivarfs to reduce the number of direct EFI reads, > with the goal of reducing how many SMIs are generated. So if you do the caching scheme, the question about narrowing permissions becomes moot... > Any obvious EFI variables that userspace tools have come to depend on-- > those which normal, unprivileged users need to read-- are helpful inputs > to this discussion. ... which solves the aspect of not breaking userspace nicely. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.