From: Joey Lee <JLee@suse.com>
To: "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"jforbes@redhat.com" <jforbes@redhat.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2019 08:21:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191107082131.GI12016@linux-l9pv.suse> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151024877315.28329.472560163492858160.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Hi experts,
On Thu, Nov 09, 2017 at 05:32:53PM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
>
> ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
> the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features. If
> supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
> way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.
>
> Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
> indistinguishable from real hardware errors. This can have undesirable
> side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
> replacement.
>
> While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
> the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
> the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
> the kernel is locked down.
>
> Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
I was looking at the lockdown pathes in v5.4-rc kernel and found that the
"acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down" did not
merged with lockdown patch set. This patch be sent with Matthew's pull
request lockdown patches for 5.2:
http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2019-March/012033.html
But it didn't show in Morris's git:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git/log/?h=next-lockdown
Maybe I missed some detail of this patch. Could anyone point out the
concern of this patch please?
> ---
>
> drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
> index b38737c83a24..6d71e1e97b20 100644
> --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
> +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
> @@ -518,6 +518,9 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2,
> int rc;
> u64 base_addr, size;
>
> + if (kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI error injection"))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> /* If user manually set "flags", make sure it is legal */
> if (flags && (flags &
> ~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF)))
>
> --
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> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Thanks
Joey Lee
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-07 8:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-09 17:30 [PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-11-09 17:30 ` [PATCH 01/30] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 03/30] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode David Howells
[not found] ` <151024863544.28329.2436580122759221600.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-09 17:30 ` [PATCH 02/30] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 09/30] hibernate: Disable when " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 30/30] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 05/30] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 06/30] kexec: Disable at runtime if " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 07/30] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
[not found] ` <151024869793.28329.4817577607302613028.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-11 11:59 ` Jiri Bohac
[not found] ` <20180111115915.dejachty3l7fwpmf-Q+Z4OdfSLAKN3ZZ/Hiejyg@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-11 12:01 ` [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 12:43 ` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-01-11 12:47 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <13005.1515674877-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-11 15:44 ` Jiri Bohac
[not found] ` <20180111154445.duootisvanetnr24-Q+Z4OdfSLAKN3ZZ/Hiejyg@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-17 16:16 ` David Howells
2018-01-11 12:02 ` [PATCH 08b/30] " Jiri Bohac
[not found] ` <20180111120157.23qceywzi6omvvkb-Q+Z4OdfSLAKN3ZZ/Hiejyg@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-16 16:31 ` [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE David Howells
2018-01-16 19:39 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-17 16:34 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <24618.1516206864-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-19 12:54 ` Jiri Bohac
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 10/30] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 11/30] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 12/30] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 13/30] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 14/30] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 15/30] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 16/30] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 17/30] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2019-11-07 8:21 ` Joey Lee [this message]
2022-05-28 0:11 ` joeyli
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 19/30] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 20/30] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 21/30] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 22/30] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 23/30] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 24/30] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 25/30] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace David Howells
[not found] ` <151024883613.28329.14808632296386937974.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-10 9:23 ` Jiri Kosina
[not found] ` <alpine.LRH.2.00.1711101021440.24296-n3slAPhISTXBD9DXoRIzZw@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-10 10:07 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <27323.1510308432-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-10 10:15 ` Jiri Kosina
[not found] ` <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1711101114410.32604-YHPUNQjx9ReKbouaWp301Q@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-10 10:21 ` David Howells
2017-11-10 10:23 ` Jiri Kosina
[not found] ` <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1711101122190.32604-YHPUNQjx9ReKbouaWp301Q@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-10 11:06 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 27/30] Lock down kprobes David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 28/30] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 29/30] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode David Howells
2018-03-03 1:18 ` [PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Andrew Morton
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