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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Marth <daniel.marth@inso.tuwien.ac.at>
Subject: [PATCH] efi: libstub: Disable struct randomization
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2022 19:29:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220822172953.3918414-1-ardb@kernel.org> (raw)

The EFI stub is a wrapper around the core kernel that makes it look like
a EFI compatible PE/COFF application to the EFI firmware. EFI
applications run on top of the EFI runtime, which is heavily based on
so-called protocols, which are struct types consisting [mostly] of
function pointer members that are instantiated and recorded in a
protocol database.

These structs look like the ideal randomization candidates to the
randstruct plugin (as they only carry function pointers), but of course,
these protocols are contracts between the firmware that exposes them,
and the EFI applications (including our stubbed kernel) that invoke
them. This means that struct randomization for EFI protocols is not a
great idea, and given that the stub shares very little data with the
core kernel that is represented as a randomizable struct, we're better
off just disabling it completely here.

Reported-by: Daniel Marth <daniel.marth@inso.tuwien.ac.at>
Tested-by: Daniel Marth <daniel.marth@inso.tuwien.ac.at>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index d0537573501e..dd8c8a218245 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -42,6 +42,13 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_SCS), $(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
 # disable LTO
 KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO), $(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
 
+#
+# struct randomization only makes sense for Linux internal types, which the EFI
+# stub code never touches, so let's turn off struct randomization for the stub
+# altogether
+#
+KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS), $(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
+
 GCOV_PROFILE			:= n
 # Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked here.
 KASAN_SANITIZE			:= n
-- 
2.35.1


             reply	other threads:[~2022-08-22 17:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-22 17:29 Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2022-08-22 19:57 ` [PATCH] efi: libstub: Disable struct randomization Kees Cook
2022-08-25  9:18   ` Ard Biesheuvel

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