From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2013 14:26:45 -0800
Message-ID: <511C1325.5060601@zytor.com>
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To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>, "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>, linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org

On 02/13/2013 09:51 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
> You can't add a new capability where there is an existing capability
> that can be remotely argued to be appropriate.
>
> If you tried to "fix" CAP_SYS_RAWIO and/or CAP_SYS_ADMIN you'd end
> up with hundreds of capabilities.
>
> Your particular problem is *not* so important that you get a
> capability all to yourself.
>

{facepalm}

This is exactly the kind of thinking which has led to the capability 
system being so bloody useless.

Capabilities need to be associated with resources, not use cases.

	-hpa


-- 
H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center
I work for Intel.  I don't speak on their behalf.