From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/12] x86: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for IO port access
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2013 18:00:18 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <51490A22.1080908@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1363642353-30749-6-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
On 03/18/2013 02:32 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
> registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
> space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
> it down by default.
>
Again, if you are going to do this, just kill bloody RAWIO. Quite
frankly saying brainfucked SCSI drivers have abused it doesn't hold
water, because as far as you know those same commands can trigger
arbitrary DMA activity.
-hpa
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-03-20 1:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-03-18 21:32 [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 03/12] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 05/12] PCI: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for PCI BAR access Matthew Garrett
2013-03-27 15:03 ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-27 15:08 ` Kyle McMartin
2013-03-28 12:46 ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 06/12] x86: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for IO port access Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:00 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 08/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 09/12] Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for /dev/mem and /dev/kmem access Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <1363642353-30749-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 02/12] SELinux: define mapping for CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 04/12] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 07/12] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 10/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <1363642353-30749-10-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-19 8:47 ` Dave Young
[not found] ` <5148261F.3030806-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-19 11:19 ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-19 17:07 ` [PATCH v2] " Josh Boyer
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 11/12] x86: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for MSR writing Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 12/12] kexec: Require CAP_SYS_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Matthew Garrett
2013-03-19 4:47 ` [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL James Morris
2013-03-20 1:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 16:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 16:49 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 18:12 ` Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <1363803158.2553.33.camel-tCUS0Eywp2Pehftex57rkxo58HMYffqeLoYNBG0abjxeoWH0uzbU5w@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-20 19:16 ` Mimi Zohar
[not found] ` <1363806968.2580.86.camel-T0Mscta5zSJpk64qw6wm7cxtgHpCUUYS@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-20 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 21:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 21:18 ` Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <1363814289.2553.41.camel-tCUS0Eywp2Pehftex57rkxo58HMYffqeLoYNBG0abjxeoWH0uzbU5w@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-21 13:43 ` Vivek Goyal
[not found] ` <20130321134348.GA3934-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-21 15:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20130321153725.GA3656-anj0Drq5vpzx6HRWoRZK3AC/G2K4zDHf@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-21 15:52 ` Vivek Goyal
[not found] ` <20130321155220.GL3934-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-21 15:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 16:04 ` Vivek Goyal
[not found] ` <20130321160441.GB6575-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-21 16:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20130321161952.GA4957-anj0Drq5vpzx6HRWoRZK3AC/G2K4zDHf@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-21 17:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 1:58 ` James Morris
2013-03-19 7:18 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2013-03-20 1:02 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 1:05 ` H. Peter Anvin
[not found] ` <51490ABD.3050205-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-20 13:15 ` Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <1363785354.2553.15.camel-tCUS0Eywp2Pehftex57rkxo58HMYffqeLoYNBG0abjxeoWH0uzbU5w@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-20 15:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
[not found] ` <db71c48c-4ec4-4611-935b-bb1b0441112d-2ueSQiBKiTY7tOexoI0I+QC/G2K4zDHf@public.gmane.org>
2013-03-20 15:14 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 16:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2013-03-20 1:05 [PATCH 06/12] x86: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for IO port access Matthew Garrett
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