From: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>,
Usama Arif <usamaarif642@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] efistub/tpm: Use ACPI reclaim memory for event log to avoid corruption
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2024 07:09:39 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <58da4824-523c-4368-9da1-05984693c811@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <29b39388-5848-4de0-9fcf-71427d10c3e8@kernel.org>
On 25. 10. 24, 7:07, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> On 24. 10. 24, 18:20, Jiri Slaby wrote:
>> On 12. 09. 24, 17:52, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>> From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
>>>
>>> The TPM event log table is a Linux specific construct, where the data
>>> produced by the GetEventLog() boot service is cached in memory, and
>>> passed on to the OS using a EFI configuration table.
>>>
>>> The use of EFI_LOADER_DATA here results in the region being left
>>> unreserved in the E820 memory map constructed by the EFI stub, and this
>>> is the memory description that is passed on to the incoming kernel by
>>> kexec, which is therefore unaware that the region should be reserved.
>>>
>>> Even though the utility of the TPM2 event log after a kexec is
>>> questionable, any corruption might send the parsing code off into the
>>> weeds and crash the kernel. So let's use EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY
>>> instead, which is always treated as reserved by the E820 conversion
>>> logic.
>>>
>>> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
>>> Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
>>> Tested-by: Usama Arif <usamaarif642@gmail.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
>>> ---
>>> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c | 2 +-
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/
>>> efi/libstub/tpm.c
>>> index df3182f2e63a..1fd6823248ab 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
>>> @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tcg2_eventlog(int version,
>>> efi_physical_addr_t log_loca
>>> }
>>> /* Allocate space for the logs and copy them. */
>>> - status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
>>> + status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY,
>>> sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size, (void **)&log_tbl);
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> this, for some reason, corrupts system configuration table. On good
>> boots, memattr points to 0x77535018, on bad boots (this commit
>> applied), it points to 0x77526018.
>>
>> And the good content at 0x77526018:
>> tab=0x77526018 size=16+45*48=0x0000000000000880
>>
>> bad content at 0x77535018:
>> tab=0x77535018 size=16+2*1705353216=0x00000000cb4b4010
>>
>> This happens only on cold boots. Subsequent boots (having the commit
>> or not) are all fine.
>>
>> Any ideas?
>
> ====
> EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY
>
> This memory is to be preserved by the UEFI OS loader and OS until ACPI
> is enabled. Once ACPI is enabled, the memory in this range is available
> for general use.
> ====
>
> BTW doesn't the above mean it is released by the time TPM actually reads
> it?
>
> Isn't the proper fix to actually memblock_reserve() that TPM portion.
> The same as memattr in efi_memattr_init()?
And this is actually done in efi_tpm_eventlog_init().
>> DMI: Dell Inc. Latitude 7290/09386V, BIOS 1.39.0 07/04/2024
>>
>> This was reported downstream at:
>> https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1231465
>>
>> thanks,
--
js
suse labs
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-25 5:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-12 15:52 [PATCH] efistub/tpm: Use ACPI reclaim memory for event log to avoid corruption Ard Biesheuvel
2024-09-13 6:27 ` Ilias Apalodimas
2024-09-13 10:00 ` Breno Leitao
2024-10-24 16:20 ` Jiri Slaby
2024-10-25 5:07 ` Jiri Slaby
2024-10-25 5:09 ` Jiri Slaby [this message]
2024-10-25 7:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-10-30 16:32 ` Gregory Price
2024-10-31 7:55 ` Jiri Slaby
2024-10-31 9:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-10-25 13:27 ` Usama Arif
2024-10-30 5:25 ` Jiri Slaby
2024-10-30 17:13 ` Usama Arif
2024-10-30 18:02 ` Gregory Price
2024-10-30 18:24 ` Usama Arif
2024-10-31 8:38 ` Jiri Slaby
2024-10-30 18:26 ` Gregory Price
2024-10-30 19:43 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-10-30 20:30 ` Gregory Price
2024-10-31 8:19 ` Jiri Slaby
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=58da4824-523c-4368-9da1-05984693c811@kernel.org \
--to=jirislaby@kernel.org \
--cc=ardb+git@google.com \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=leitao@debian.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=usamaarif642@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox