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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linuxppc-dev-uLR06cmDAlY/bJ5BZ2RsiQ@public.gmane.org,
	kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Piotr Luc <piotr.luc-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
	Reza Arbab
	<arbab-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Matt Fleming
	<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov"
	<kirill.shutemov-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel
	<ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Andrew Morton
	<akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>,
	Benjamin
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 09:29:40 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7236d267-ebcb-8b45-b8d3-5955903e395f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170725102657.GD21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>

On 7/25/2017 5:26 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:42PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
>>
>> Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the
>> Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature.  SME is identified by
>> CPUID 0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of
>> MSR_K8_SYSCFG and set bit 0 of MSR_K7_HWCR).  Only show the SEV feature
>> as available if reported by CPUID and enabled by BIOS.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  1 +
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |  2 ++
>>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c          | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c    |  1 +
>>   4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> ...
> 
>> @@ -637,6 +642,21 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>   			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
>>   		}
>>   	}
>> +
>> +	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
>> +		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
>> +			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
>> +		} else {
>> +			u64 syscfg, hwcr;
>> +
>> +			/* Check if SEV is enabled */
>> +			rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, syscfg);
>> +			rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
>> +			if (!(syscfg & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) ||
>> +			    !(hwcr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
>> +				clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
>> +		}
>> +	}
> 
> Let's simplify this and read the MSRs only once. Diff ontop. Please
> check if I'm missing a case:

Yup, we can do something like that.  I believe the only change that
would be needed to your patch would be to move the IS_ENABLED() check
to after the physical address space reduction check.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> index c413f04bdd41..79af07731ab1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> @@ -546,6 +546,48 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>   	}
>   }
>   
> +static void early_detect_mem_enc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> +{
> +	u64 syscfg, hwcr;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * BIOS support is required for SME and SEV.
> +	 *   For SME: If BIOS has enabled SME then adjust x86_phys_bits by
> +	 *	      the SME physical address space reduction value.
> +	 *	      If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
> +	 *	      SME feature (set in scattered.c).
> +	 *   For SEV: If BIOS has not enabled SEV then don't advertise the
> +	 *            SEV feature (set in scattered.c).
> +	 *
> +	 *   In all cases, since support for SME and SEV requires long mode,
> +	 *   don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
> +	 */
> +	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME) ||
> +	    cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
> +
> +		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
> +			goto clear;
> +
> +		/* Check if SME is enabled */
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, syscfg);
> +		if (!(syscfg & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> +			goto clear;
> +
> +		c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
> +
> +		/* Check if SEV is enabled */
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
> +		if (!(hwcr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
> +			goto clear_sev;
> +
> +		return;
> +clear:
> +		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
> +clear_sev:
> +		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
> +	}
> +}
> +
>   static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>   {
>   	u32 dummy;
> @@ -617,46 +659,8 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>   	if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_400))
>   		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
>   
> -	/*
> -	 * BIOS support is required for SME and SEV.
> -	 *   For SME: If BIOS has enabled SME then adjust x86_phys_bits by
> -	 *	      the SME physical address space reduction value.
> -	 *	      If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
> -	 *	      SME feature (set in scattered.c).
> -	 *   For SEV: If BIOS has not enabled SEV then don't advertise the
> -	 *            SEV feature (set in scattered.c).
> -	 *
> -	 *   In all cases, since support for SME and SEV requires long mode,
> -	 *   don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
> -	 */
> -	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME)) {
> -		u64 msr;
> -
> -		/* Check if SME is enabled */
> -		rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
> -		if (msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) {
> -			c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
> -			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
> -				clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
> -		} else {
> -			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
> -		}
> -	}
> +	early_detect_mem_enc(c);
>   
> -	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
> -		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
> -			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
> -		} else {
> -			u64 syscfg, hwcr;
> -
> -			/* Check if SEV is enabled */
> -			rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, syscfg);
> -			rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
> -			if (!(syscfg & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) ||
> -			    !(hwcr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
> -				clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
> -		}
> -	}
>   }
>   
>   static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-07-25 14:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-3-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 10:26     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20170725102657.GD21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:29         ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
     [not found]           ` <7236d267-ebcb-8b45-b8d3-5955903e395f-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:36             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17                       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17  8:12                         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-4-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26  4:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <facf3ac6-ebda-57a7-f961-6029b3ac7be7-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 13:39           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-8-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 14:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28  8:47       ` David Laight
     [not found]         ` <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD0045508-VkEWCZq2GCInGFn1LkZF6NBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:21           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-9-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-28 10:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31  8:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-12-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-02  4:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-1-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-2-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25  5:45       ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]         ` <20170725054522.GA21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:59           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-6-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 16:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20170728152342.GB11564-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:55         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07  3:48     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <42cf82fc-03be-c4c7-eaab-b2306a049d20-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-25 12:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-18-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-31 15:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  9:51   ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
     [not found]       ` <CAK8P3a3h7JpmkW7W=HwqAuWWmro=ngj6HSeiiML_=T82x-FtZQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 19:24         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27  7:45               ` David Laight
     [not found]               ` <589d65a4-eb09-bae9-e8b4-a2d78ca6b509-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-22 16:52                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48                         ` Brijesh Singh
     [not found]                           ` <ad628a45-8e4e-9cfc-2cc4-33dc6bf4613a-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:22                             ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]                               ` <20170915162256.7l4vyy4ee5zeqbir-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:27                                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02  3:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]             ` <CALCETrV+rv=9Rg5V1z8vHtVDW64eCNtZHQMW8DipRADvm+qP5A-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-03  2:34               ` Brijesh Singh
     [not found]           ` <8155b5b2-b2b3-bc8f-33ae-b81b661a2e38-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-04 17:05             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47               ` Brijesh Singh

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