From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org (Eric W. Biederman) Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2012 01:49:25 -0700 Message-ID: <87625ogzje.fsf@xmission.com> References: <1351783096.2391.77.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <1351803800.2391.96.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121101210634.GA19723@srcf.ucam.org> <20121101213127.5967327f@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <20121101212843.GA20309@srcf.ucam.org> <20121101213751.377ebaa8@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <20121101213452.GA20564@srcf.ucam.org> <20121101215817.79e50ec2@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <20121101215752.GA21154@srcf.ucam.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20121101215752.GA21154-1xO5oi07KQx4cg9Nei1l7Q@public.gmane.org> (Matthew Garrett's message of "Thu, 1 Nov 2012 21:57:52 +0000") Sender: linux-efi-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: Matthew Garrett Cc: Alan Cox , James Bottomley , Eric Paris , Jiri Kosina , Oliver Neukum , Chris Friesen , Josh Boyer , linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Matthew Garrett writes: > On Thu, Nov 01, 2012 at 09:58:17PM +0000, Alan Cox wrote: >> On Thu, 1 Nov 2012 21:34:52 +0000 >> Matthew Garrett wrote: >> > I think you've misunderstood. Blacklist updates are append only. >> >> I think you've misunderstood - thats a technical detail that merely >> alters the cost to the people who did something improper. > > Winning a case is cold comfort if your software has been uninstallable > for the years it took to get through the courts. If others want to take > that risk, fine. When the goal is to secure Linux I don't see how any of this helps. Windows 8 compromises are already available so if we turn most of these arguments around I am certain clever attackers can go through windows to run compromised kernel on a linux system, at least as easily as the reverse. Short of instructing UEFI to stop trusting the Microsoft signing key I don't see any of the secureboot dance gaining any security of computers running linux or security from keys being revoked for non-sense reasons. Eric