Linux EFI development
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 messages from 2013-08-13 13:56:56 to 2013-08-29 22:30:17 UTC [more...]

[RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
 2013-08-29 22:30 UTC  (95+ messages)
` [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP
  ` [PATCH 01/18] asymmetric keys: add interface and skeleton for implement signature generation
  ` [PATCH 02/18] asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa
  ` [PATCH 04/18] asymmetric keys: implement OS2IP "
  ` [PATCH 10/18] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware
  ` [PATCH 11/18] Hibernate: introduced RSA key-pair to verify signature of snapshot
  ` [PATCH 12/18] Hibernate: generate and "
  ` [PATCH 13/18] Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image
  ` [PATCH 15/18] Hibernate: adapt to UEFI secure boot with signature check
  ` [PATCH 16/18] Hibernate: show the verification time for monitor performance
` [PATCH 05/18] asymmetric keys: implement RSASP1
` [PATCH 06/18] asymmetric keys: support parsing PKCS #8 private key information
` [PATCH 07/18] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message
` [PATCH 08/18] Secure boot: Add new capability
` [PATCH 09/18] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode
` [PATCH 14/18] Hibernate: applied SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION config to switch signature check
` [PATCH 17/18] Hibernate: introduced SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH config for select hash algorithm
` [PATCH 18/18] Hibernate: notify bootloader regenerate key-pair for snapshot verification

EFI mode after running kexec
 2013-08-29 20:53 UTC  (7+ messages)

[PATCH 01/10] Add secure_modules() call
 2013-08-29 19:28 UTC  (20+ messages)
` [PATCH 02/10] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled
  ` [PATCH 03/10] x86: Lock down IO port "
  ` [PATCH 04/10] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
  ` [PATCH 10/10] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode
` [PATCH 05/10] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted
` [PATCH 06/10] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem "
` [PATCH 07/10] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter "
` [PATCH 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions
` [PATCH 09/10] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted

[PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted
 2013-08-29 18:37 UTC  (23+ messages)
` [PATCH V2 01/10] Add secure_modules() call
` [PATCH V2 03/10] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is enabled
` [PATCH V2 04/10] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
` [PATCH V2 05/10] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted
` [PATCH V2 07/10] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter "
` [PATCH V2 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions
` [PATCH V2 09/10] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted
  ` [PATCH V2 02/10] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled
  ` [PATCH V2 06/10] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is restricted
  ` [PATCH V2 10/10] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode

[SPAM] - let's discuss further
 2013-08-25 12:02 UTC 

[PATCH V3 RFC 00/16] EFI stub for ARM
 2013-08-23 22:40 UTC  (31+ messages)
` [PATCH 04/16] Add minimum address parameter to efi_low_alloc()
` [PATCH 05/16] rename __get_map() to efi_get_memory_map(), add parameter to optionally return mmap key. The mmap key is required to exit EFI boot services, and allows efi_get_memory_map() to be used for getting final memory map
` [PATCH 06/16] Enforce minimum alignment of 1 page on allocations. The efi_high_alloc() and efi_low_alloc() functions use the EFI_ALLOCATE_ADDRESS option to the EFI function allocate_pages(), which requires a minimum of page alignment, and rejects all other requests
` [PATCH 08/16] Generalize handle_ramdisks() and rename to handle_cmdline_files()
` [PATCH 09/16] Renames in handle_cmdline_files() to complete generalization
` [PATCH 10/16] Move EFI_READ_CHUNK_SIZE define to shared location
` [PATCH 11/16] Add proper definitions for some EFI function pointers
` [PATCH 12/16] Fix types in EFI calls to match EFI function definitions
` [PATCH 13/16] resolve warnings found on ARM compile
` [PATCH 15/16] Add EFI stub for ARM
` [PATCH 16/16] Add config EFI_STUB for ARM to Kconfig

[PATCH] x86: EFI stub support for large memory maps
 2013-08-23 21:02 UTC 

[PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
 2013-08-22 11:00 UTC  (2+ messages)
  ` [PATCH 01/18] asymmetric keys: add interface and skeleton for implement signature generation

[RFC][PATCH] efivars,efi-pstore: Hold off deletion of sysfs entry until the scan is completed
 2013-08-20 21:22 UTC 

[RFC PATCH 0/4] EFI boot stub memory map fix
 2013-08-19 21:39 UTC  (9+ messages)
  ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] efi: Decouple efi_memmap_init() and do_add_efi_memmap()
` [RFC PATCH 2/4] efi: Add memory_setup function efi_memory_setup()
` [RFC PATCH 3/4] efi: Add efi_memmap_needed()
` [RFC PATCH 4/4] x86: Fix EFI boot stub for large memory maps

UEFI Plugfest 2013 -- New Orleans
 2013-08-19 21:30 UTC  (17+ messages)

[edk2] Corrupted EFI region
 2013-08-18  7:33 UTC  (13+ messages)

RFC: default CONFIG_EFI_STUB=y
 2013-08-15  5:15 UTC  (9+ messages)

[PATCH V2 00/17] EFI stub for ARM
 2013-08-13 14:21 UTC  (5+ messages)
` [PATCH 16/17] Add "


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