messages from 2017-10-13 19:47:46 to 2017-11-09 17:33:08 UTC [more...]
[PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
2017-11-09 17:33 UTC (21+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/30] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
` [PATCH 02/30] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
` [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 09/30] hibernate: Disable when "
` [PATCH 03/30] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode
` [PATCH 05/30] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 06/30] kexec: Disable at runtime if "
` [PATCH 07/30] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 10/30] uswsusp: Disable when "
` [PATCH 11/30] PCI: Lock down BAR access "
` [PATCH 12/30] x86: Lock down IO port "
` [PATCH 13/30] x86/msr: Restrict MSR "
` [PATCH 14/30] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface "
` [PATCH 15/30] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method "
` [PATCH 16/30] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been "
` [PATCH 17/30] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is "
` [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection "
` [PATCH 19/30] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
` [PATCH 20/30] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
[PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
2017-11-09 17:15 UTC (112+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when "
` [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if "
` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
` [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: "
` [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access "
` [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port "
` [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR "
` [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface "
` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method "
` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been "
` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is "
` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection "
` [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when "
` [PATCH 19/27] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
` [PATCH 20/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 21/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
` [PATCH 23/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
` [PATCH 24/27] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore
` [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
` [PATCH 27/27] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in "
` Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
[PATCH 0/3] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
2017-11-09 16:58 UTC (13+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/3] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU
` [PATCH 2/3] arm64: Prepare SCTLR_ELn accesses to handle Falkor erratum 1041
` [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for "
` [3/3] "
[PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
2017-11-06 7:13 UTC (5+ messages)
` [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
[PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
2017-11-03 15:27 UTC (2+ messages)
Darlehensangebot
2017-11-02 11:54 UTC
efi/esrt: use memunmap rather kfree to free the remapping
2017-10-29 14:51 UTC
[PATCH] efi: setting secure boot flag in EFI stub when the sentinel is tainted
2017-10-28 12:34 UTC
[GIT PULL] EFI fixes
2017-10-27 19:10 UTC
[PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
2017-10-27 16:30 UTC (11+ messages)
Multiple Acer laptops hang on ACPI poweroff
2017-10-27 8:40 UTC (4+ messages)
[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
2017-10-26 19:20 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH v3 0/5] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
2017-10-26 18:58 UTC (20+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log "
[PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
2017-10-25 14:46 UTC (10+ messages)
[GIT PULL 0/2] EFI updates for v4.15
2017-10-25 10:14 UTC (3+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/2] efi/capsule-loader: pr_err() strings should end with newlines
` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
[GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.14
2017-10-25 10:04 UTC (3+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps()
` [PATCH 2/2] efi/libstub: arm: don't randomize runtime regions when CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y
Статьи, способствующие раскрутке web-сайтов
2017-10-25 7:13 UTC
Betr.: Spende
2017-10-24 8:15 UTC
Продвижение Ваших веб-сайтов статьями
2017-10-24 7:07 UTC
[PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: don't randomize runtime regions when CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y
2017-10-23 9:03 UTC
[Part1 PATCH v7 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
2017-10-20 14:30 UTC
[PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value
2017-10-18 13:54 UTC (3+ messages)
Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
2017-10-18 8:21 UTC (2+ messages)
[RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
2017-10-16 20:47 UTC (8+ messages)
` [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs
(unknown),
2017-10-16 19:44 UTC
[Part1 PATCH v6 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
2017-10-16 15:34 UTC
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