messages from 2017-10-27 15:28:50 to 2017-12-04 15:59:29 UTC [more...]
[PATCH 4.4 03/27] x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers
2017-12-04 15:59 UTC (2+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.4 04/27] x86/efi: Hoist page table switching code into efi_call_virt()
arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP
2017-12-04 14:02 UTC (9+ messages)
[GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
2017-12-04 14:00 UTC (25+ messages)
[PATCH v4 0/2] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
2017-12-03 13:35 UTC (5+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU
` [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
[PATCH] fix system_state checking in early_ioremap
2017-12-03 0:55 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH 0/4] Using the hash in MOKx to blacklist kernel module
2017-12-01 6:59 UTC (7+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/4] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled
` [PATCH 2/4] MODSIGN: print appropriate status message when getting UEFI certificates list
` [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: load blacklist from MOKx
` [PATCH 4/4] MODSIGN: checking the blacklisted hash before loading a kernel module
[PATCH v5 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
2017-11-30 14:46 UTC (3+ messages)
` [PATCH v5 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*
` [PATCH v5 26/27] x86_32: "
Хотела бы найти подработку копирайтером, рерайтером
2017-11-30 6:24 UTC
[PATCH] x86: move parse_early_param to earlier code for add_efi_memmap
2017-11-30 5:23 UTC
[PATCH 0/4] Using the hash in MOKx to blacklist kernel module
2017-11-29 14:00 UTC
[PATCH] efi: Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO()
2017-11-28 21:39 UTC
[PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
2017-11-16 0:05 UTC (78+ messages)
` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift "
` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
` Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
[PATCH v3 0/2] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
2017-11-15 23:24 UTC (6+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/2] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU
` [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
` [v3,2/2] "
Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
2017-11-15 21:12 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH 0/3] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
2017-11-15 15:12 UTC (17+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/3] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU
` [PATCH 2/3] arm64: Prepare SCTLR_ELn accesses to handle Falkor erratum 1041
` [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for "
` [3/3] "
Hello Dear
2017-11-15 11:33 UTC
Re:
2017-11-13 14:55 UTC
[PATCH v2 0/2] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
2017-11-13 1:54 UTC (4+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU
` [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
[PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
2017-11-10 11:06 UTC (37+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/30] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
` [PATCH 03/30] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode
` [PATCH 05/30] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 06/30] kexec: Disable at runtime if "
` [PATCH 07/30] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 10/30] uswsusp: Disable when "
` [PATCH 11/30] PCI: Lock down BAR access "
` [PATCH 12/30] x86: Lock down IO port "
` [PATCH 13/30] x86/msr: Restrict MSR "
` [PATCH 14/30] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface "
` [PATCH 15/30] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method "
` [PATCH 16/30] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been "
` [PATCH 17/30] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is "
` [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection "
` [PATCH 19/30] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
` [PATCH 20/30] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 21/30] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
` [PATCH 22/30] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
` [PATCH 23/30] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
` [PATCH 24/30] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 25/30] Lock down /proc/kcore
` [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace
` [PATCH 27/30] Lock down kprobes
` [PATCH 28/30] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 29/30] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
` [PATCH 02/30] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
` [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 09/30] hibernate: Disable when "
` [PATCH 30/30] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
[PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
2017-11-06 7:13 UTC (5+ messages)
` [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
[PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
2017-11-03 15:27 UTC (2+ messages)
Darlehensangebot
2017-11-02 11:54 UTC
efi/esrt: use memunmap rather kfree to free the remapping
2017-10-29 14:51 UTC
[PATCH] efi: setting secure boot flag in EFI stub when the sentinel is tainted
2017-10-28 12:34 UTC
[GIT PULL] EFI fixes
2017-10-27 19:10 UTC
[PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
2017-10-27 16:30 UTC (5+ messages)
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