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 messages from 2025-06-26 13:16:50 to 2025-07-09 08:11:23 UTC [more...]

[PATCH v4 00/24] x86: strict separation of startup code
 2025-07-09  8:08 UTC  (11+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 01/24] x86/sev: Separate MSR and GHCB based snp_cpuid() via a callback
` [PATCH v4 02/24] x86/sev: Use MSR protocol for remapping SVSM calling area
` [PATCH v4 03/24] x86/sev: Use MSR protocol only for early SVSM PVALIDATE call
` [PATCH v4 04/24] x86/sev: Run RMPADJUST on SVSM calling area page to test VMPL
` [PATCH v4 05/24] x86/sev: Move GHCB page based HV communication out of startup code
` [PATCH v4 06/24] x86/sev: Avoid global variable to store virtual address of SVSM area
` [PATCH v4 07/24] x86/sev: Move MSR save/restore out of early page state change helper
` [PATCH v4 08/24] x86/sev: Share implementation of MSR-based page state change
` [PATCH v4 09/24] x86/sev: Pass SVSM calling area down to early page state change API
` [PATCH v4 10/24] x86/sev: Use boot SVSM CA for all startup and init code

[efi:next] BUILD REGRESSION 42c68c6e354f71498f9e3e31aa5b0f9243bc1618
 2025-07-09  6:14 UTC 

[efi:next 1/1] ERROR: modpost: "efi_kobj" [drivers/firmware/efi/ovmf-debug-log.ko] undefined!
 2025-07-09  6:10 UTC 

[PATCHv9 00/16] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support
 2025-07-09  5:31 UTC  (24+ messages)
` [PATCHv9 01/16] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits
` [PATCHv9 02/16] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives
` [PATCHv9 03/16] x86/cpu: Set LASS CR4 bit as pinning sensitive
` [PATCHv9 04/16] x86/cpu: Defer CR pinning setup until core initcall
` [PATCHv9 05/16] efi: Disable LASS around set_virtual_address_map() EFI call
` [PATCHv9 06/16] x86/vsyscall: Do not require X86_PF_INSTR to emulate vsyscall
` [PATCHv9 07/16] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the #PF emulation code
` [PATCHv9 08/16] x86/traps: Consolidate user fixups in exc_general_protection()
` [PATCHv9 09/16] x86/vsyscall: Add vsyscall emulation for #GP
` [PATCHv9 10/16] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE
` [PATCHv9 11/16] x86/traps: Communicate a LASS violation in #GP message
` [PATCHv9 12/16] x86/traps: Generalize #GP address decode and hint code
` [PATCHv9 13/16] x86/traps: Handle LASS thrown #SS
` [PATCHv9 14/16] x86/cpu: Enable LASS during CPU initialization
` [PATCHv9 15/16] x86/cpu: Make LAM depend on LASS
` [PATCHv9 16/16] x86: Re-enable Linear Address Masking

[GIT PULL] EFI fixes for v6.16 #1
 2025-07-08 16:00 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] arm64: fix unnecessary rebuilding when CONFIG_DEBUG_EFI=y
 2025-07-08 14:44 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH 0/8] arm64: set VMAP_STACK by default
 2025-07-08 14:44 UTC  (15+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/8] arm64: Enable VMAP_STACK support
` [PATCH 2/8] arm64: efi: Remove CONFIG_VMAP_STACK check
` [PATCH 3/8] arm64: Remove CONFIG_VMAP_STACK conditionals from THREAD_SHIFT and THREAD_ALIGN
` [PATCH 4/8] arm64: remove CONFIG_VMAP_STACK conditionals from irq stack setup
` [PATCH 5/8] arm64: remove CONFIG_VMAP_STACK conditionals from traps overflow stack
` [PATCH 6/8] arm64: remove CONFIG_VMAP_STACK checks from stacktrace overflow logic
` [PATCH 7/8] arm64: remove CONFIG_VMAP_STACK checks from SDEI stack handling
` [PATCH 8/8] arm64: remove CONFIG_VMAP_STACK checks from entry code

[PATCH v2] efi: add ovmf debug log driver
 2025-07-08 13:06 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] efi: add ovmf debug log driver
 2025-07-08 12:09 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH V4] efi/tpm: Fix the issue where the CC platforms event log header can't be correctly identified
 2025-07-08  7:54 UTC 

[PATCH V3] efi/tpm: Fix the issue where the CC platforms event log header can't be correctly identified
 2025-07-08  7:39 UTC  (3+ messages)

[PATCH] efistub: Lower default log level
 2025-07-08  7:31 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH v3 0/8] firmware: qcom: enable UEFI variables on Lenovo Yoga C630
 2025-07-08  3:18 UTC  (3+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/8] efi: efivars: don't crash in efivar_set_variable{,_locked} in r/o case

[PATCH] efi: Drop preprocessor directives from zboot.lds
 2025-07-08  0:46 UTC  (5+ messages)

[PATCH] arm64: efi: Fix KASAN false positive for EFI runtime stack
 2025-07-07 16:08 UTC  (9+ messages)

[PATCHv8 00/17] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support
 2025-07-07  9:33 UTC  (60+ messages)
` [PATCHv8 01/17] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits
` [PATCHv8 02/17] x86/asm: Introduce inline memcpy and memset
` [PATCHv8 03/17] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives
` [PATCHv8 04/17] x86/cpu: Defer CR pinning setup until after EFI initialization
` [PATCHv8 05/17] efi: Disable LASS around set_virtual_address_map() EFI call
` [PATCHv8 06/17] x86/vsyscall: Do not require X86_PF_INSTR to emulate vsyscall
` [PATCHv8 07/17] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the #PF emulation code
` [PATCHv8 08/17] x86/traps: Consolidate user fixups in exc_general_protection()
` [PATCHv8 09/17] x86/vsyscall: Add vsyscall emulation for #GP
` [PATCHv8 10/17] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE
` [PATCHv8 11/17] x86/cpu: Set LASS CR4 bit as pinning sensitive
` [PATCHv8 12/17] x86/traps: Communicate a LASS violation in #GP message
` [PATCHv8 13/17] x86/traps: Generalize #GP address decode and hint code
` [PATCHv8 14/17] x86/traps: Handle LASS thrown #SS
` [PATCHv8 15/17] x86/cpu: Make LAM depend on LASS
` [PATCHv8 16/17] x86/cpu: Enable LASS during CPU initialization
` [PATCHv8 17/17] x86: Re-enable Linear Address Masking

[PATCH v3 1/2] efi/libstub: Print error message if efi_allocate_bootparams() fails
 2025-07-06 17:02 UTC  (2+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 2/2] efi/libstub: Print uefi status code on error messages

[PATCH v2 1/2] efi/libstub: Print error message if efi_allocate_bootparams() fails
 2025-07-06 13:24 UTC  (3+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 2/2] efi/libstub: Print uefi status code on error messages

[PATCH 1/2] efi/libstub: Print error message if efi_allocate_bootparams() fails
 2025-07-06 10:08 UTC  (4+ messages)
` [PATCH 2/2] efi/libstub: Print uefi status code on error messages
` [PATCH v2 "

[PATCH V2] efi/tpm: Fix the issue where the CC platforms event log header can't be correctly identified
 2025-07-05 16:51 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] efi/tpm: Fix the issue where the CC platforms event log header can't be correctly identified
 2025-07-05  6:59 UTC  (7+ messages)

[PATCH v2] arm64: efi: Fix KASAN false positive for EFI runtime stack
 2025-07-04 17:44 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH v4 0/2] integrity: Extract secure boot enquiry function out of IMA
 2025-07-04  7:51 UTC  (3+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 1/2] x86/efi: Rename IMA-related function and macro of boot mode
` [PATCH v4 2/2] integrity: Extract secure boot enquiry function out of IMA

[PATCH v3 0/2] integrity: Extract secure boot enquiry function out of IMA
 2025-07-03  1:43 UTC  (3+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/efi: Rename IMA-related function and macro of boot mode
` [PATCH v3 2/2] integrity: Extract secure boot enquiry function out of IMA

[PATCH v4 0/8] firmware: qcom: enable UEFI variables on Lenovo Yoga C630
 2025-07-01 11:10 UTC  (27+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 1/8] efi: efivars: don't crash in efivar_set_variable{,_locked} in r/o case
` [PATCH v4 5/8] firmware; qcom: scm: enable QSEECOM on SC8280XP CRD
` [PATCH v4 6/8] firmware: qcom: scm: add modparam to control QSEECOM enablement

[PATCHv7 00/16] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support
 2025-06-30  9:50 UTC  (18+ messages)
` [PATCHv7 01/16] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits
` [PATCHv7 03/16] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives
` [PATCHv7 13/16] x86/traps: Handle LASS thrown #SS

[PATCHv6 00/16] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support
 2025-06-27 13:57 UTC  (14+ messages)
` [PATCHv6 01/16] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits

[PATCH v14 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support
 2025-06-27  9:15 UTC  (5+ messages)
` [PATCH v14 04/19] x86: Secure Launch main header file

[PATCH 0/2] Secure Boot lock down
 2025-06-26 22:10 UTC  (3+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/2] security: introduce security_lock_kernel_down()
` [PATCH 2/2] efi: introduce EFI_KERNEL_LOCK_DOWN_IN_SECURE_BOOT


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