From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F23A515696E; Fri, 1 Nov 2024 09:31:00 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730453461; cv=none; b=IWBvY75AbdMrlZjt+T7I9hCwMe6x44BYPHYs0TtRN7BqOIebZlfImQDpXHkxGUu7XVObcnIkkQqFxpR6DUbdkW1GXlpTVUsoLA13wZA2UUaKJNp1blmTlrvOAoUzN8bqwBvR90nw5eSDgnf5D2zyRgTNzTIZoc0obFbFt1sM5co= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730453461; c=relaxed/simple; bh=E2hqZuQZtN0s10rwxtt69HOZ+Xb8z/BgC9HjxUEaI8I=; h=Mime-Version:Content-Type:Date:Message-Id:Cc:Subject:From:To: References:In-Reply-To; b=W6I3JoiQv9gu6X8GVHgc1CbGd0wPe6mnl4/hiMxSJVUxr96EVUv3KgXjgkGEElTIgd3q6QFN5Kv6mik3I23yhIj07tHuE+X+CeRH0hzAIvmWXN7M6q8o9w6T8NQJHGy46q9yCnrIGYP74dsYRCBHwzwj/jOZOPldyi9f1YxR154= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Zkya8/hD; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Zkya8/hD" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C81E9C4CECD; Fri, 1 Nov 2024 09:30:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1730453460; bh=E2hqZuQZtN0s10rwxtt69HOZ+Xb8z/BgC9HjxUEaI8I=; h=Date:Cc:Subject:From:To:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=Zkya8/hD7vHw7APlNFmnxhWEkpDonfTxxz8OWZ+5yd6bN6LCtcPcxwsVE4U7z6DDP axnPzOvjCL6gChmB6XulcLUOprx36LAu5iMNXWzVPRXPbDOqKpoLUJ6iduXcDyflT/ MGr+5cRmIRyVpfucy34v+J2ldo2IwS6yp/UXbWLgo3x0F4O1nUVnbJY3WBeqM6aRXF EP7NRCMufh/YmLLTgvYeE4Z82criQF5xuFnk5KcA3VUhhV8BGeltxg2rih8cv0ya7h Fd7aWjWXjLqa6ANGOzuDQQWJu596wZ/9wiXgDCCm/AHABThwJgXn6v4l7PmyqqFSTi q48cT5bH1WOWQ== Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2024 11:30:56 +0200 Message-Id: Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" , "Ross Philipson" , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" , "Ard Biesheuvel" X-Mailer: aerc 0.18.2 References: <20240913200517.3085794-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> <87wmhoulb9.ffs@tglx> <87ldy3vpjh.ffs@tglx> In-Reply-To: On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 11:18 AM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 10:50 AM EET, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > On Fri, 1 Nov 2024 at 01:40, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 2:33 AM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 1:08 AM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Nov 01 2024 at 00:37, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > On Thu Oct 31, 2024 at 9:25 PM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > > > > > >> So this looks pretty reasonable to me by now and I'm inclined = to take it > > > > > >> through the tip x86 tree, but that needs reviewed/acked-by's f= rom the > > > > > >> crypto and TPM folks. EFI has been reviewed already. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Can we make progress on this please? > > > > > > > > > > > > So TPM patches do have bunch of glitches: > > > > > > > > > > > > - 15/20: I don't get this. There is nothing to report unless tr= ee > > > > > > is falling. The reported-by tag literally meaningless. Maybe = this > > > > > > is something that makes sense with this feature. Explain from= that > > > > > > angle. > > > > > > - 16/20: Is this actually a bug fix? If it is should be before = 15/20. > > > > > > - 17/20: the commit message could do a better job explaining ho= w the > > > > > > locality can vary. I'm not sure how this will be used by rest= of > > > > > > the patch set. > > > > > > - 18/20: I'm not confident we want to give privilege to set loc= ality > > > > > > to the user space. The commit message neither makes a case of= this. > > > > > > Has this been tested to together with bus encryption (just ch= ecking)? > > > > > > > > > > Can you please explicitely voice your detailed technical concerns= in > > > > > replies to the actual patches? > > > > > > > > - 15/20 looks like a rigged patch. I don't really know why it is do= ne > > > > so it is hard to either suggest how "resolve it". > > > > - 16/20 probably makes sense but if it is a bug fix or part of it i= s, > > > > the bug fix should have relevant fixes etc tags so that it can be > > > > picked up to stable kernels. > > > > - 17-18/20: I'd speak about this as the "one whole" i.e. here the > > > > privilege to be able change locality during run-time is really > > > > concerning. Could the locality be figured out for the kernel > > > > command-line instead? The sysfs attribute can exist as read-only. > > > > > > > > So yeah, the way I see it 15-16 are the more trivial issue to sort > > > > out (probably) but with 17-18 we have an actual architectural conce= rn > > > > for kernel overall. > > > > > > Further: > > > > > > 15/20: I can accept this without reported-by tag (or changed as > > > suggested-by). It does not harm. > > > 16/20: I'll re-review this with time. I'll try to get this done > > > latest next week. > > > > > > So let's put focus only on 17 and 18. Can this problem be sorted out > > > by kernel command-line parameter? In the case of locality we want to > > > keep regular "chain of trust" i.e. boot-loader makes the decision, > > > *even* in the case of DRTM. I would call this almost as constraint > > > that would be wise to set. > > > > > > > Please don't add a kernel command line parameter for this - the code > > running in the decompressor will be the one setting it and there are > > better ways to pass information between these components (and the > > slaunch stack is already doing that in any case) > > Not sure if I follow this (I don't know what "decompressor" is). Right you refer to the process running GETSEC[SENTER], sorry, in the page w= ith this detail. BR, Jarkko