From: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, "Peter Jones" <pjones@redhat.com>,
"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
"Oleksandr Tyshchenko" <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Anton Vorontsov" <anton@enomsg.org>,
"Colin Cross" <ccross@android.com>,
"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
"Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 4/5] efi: Apply allowlist to EFI configuration tables when running under Xen
Date: Sun, 2 Oct 2022 12:27:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yzm8H3iS7ziWsh7E@itl-email> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221002095626.484279-5-ardb@kernel.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3465 bytes --]
On Sun, Oct 02, 2022 at 11:56:25AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> As it turns out, Xen does not guarantee that EFI bootservices data
> regions in memory are preserved, which means that EFI configuration
> tables pointing into such memory regions may be corrupted before the
> dom0 OS has had a chance to inspect them.
>
> Demi Marie reports that this is causing problems for Qubes OS when it
> attempts to perform system firmware updates, which requires that the
> contents of the ESRT configuration table are valid when the fwupd user
> space program runs.
>
> However, other configuration tables such as the memory attributes
> table or the runtime properties table are equally affected, and so we
> need a comprehensive workaround that works for any table type.
>
> So let's first disregard all EFI configuration tables except the ones
> that are known (or can be expected) to reside in memory regions of a
> type that Xen preserves, i.e., ACPI tables (which are passed in
> EfiAcpiReclaimMemory regions) and SMBIOS tables (which are usually
> passed in EfiRuntimeServicesData regions, even though the UEFI spec only
> mentions this as a recommendation). Then, cross reference unknown tables
> against either the EFI memory map (if available) or do a Xen hypercall
> to determine the memory type, and allow the config table if the type is
> one that is guaranteed to be preserved.
>
> Future patches can augment the logic in this routine to allow other
> table types based on the size of the allocation, or based on a table
> specific header size field.
>
> Co-developed-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
> Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> ---
> drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 7 ++
> drivers/xen/efi.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/efi.h | 2 +
> 3 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> index 11857af72859..e8c0747011d7 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> @@ -556,6 +556,13 @@ static __init int match_config_table(const efi_guid_t *guid,
>
> for (i = 0; efi_guidcmp(table_types[i].guid, NULL_GUID); i++) {
> if (!efi_guidcmp(*guid, table_types[i].guid)) {
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_EFI) &&
> + !xen_efi_config_table_is_usable(guid, table)) {
> + if (table_types[i].name[0])
> + pr_cont("(%s=0x%lx) ",
> + table_types[i].name, table);
> + return 1;
> + }
> *(table_types[i].ptr) = table;
> if (table_types[i].name[0])
> pr_cont("%s=0x%lx ",
> diff --git a/drivers/xen/efi.c b/drivers/xen/efi.c
> index d1ff2186ebb4..3f1f365b37d0 100644
> --- a/drivers/xen/efi.c
> +++ b/drivers/xen/efi.c
> @@ -292,3 +292,72 @@ void __init xen_efi_runtime_setup(void)
> efi.get_next_high_mono_count = xen_efi_get_next_high_mono_count;
> efi.reset_system = xen_efi_reset_system;
> }
> +
> +static const efi_guid_t cfg_table_allow_list[] __initconst = {
> + ACPI_20_TABLE_GUID,
> + ACPI_TABLE_GUID,
> + SMBIOS_TABLE_GUID,
> + SMBIOS3_TABLE_GUID,
> +};
This allowlist seems redundant. Either the tables are already in memory
that Xen will preserve or they aren’t. In both cases the subsequent
code will do the right thing.
--
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
Invisible Things Lab
[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 833 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-02 16:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-02 9:56 [RFC PATCH 0/5] efi/x86: Avoid corrupted config tables under Xen Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-02 9:56 ` [RFC PATCH 1/5] efi: Move EFI fake memmap support into x86 arch tree Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-02 9:56 ` [RFC PATCH 2/5] efi: memmap: Move manipulation routines " Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-02 9:56 ` [RFC PATCH 3/5] efi: xen: Set EFI_PARAVIRT for Xen dom0 boot on all architectures Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-02 9:56 ` [RFC PATCH 4/5] efi: Apply allowlist to EFI configuration tables when running under Xen Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-02 16:27 ` Demi Marie Obenour [this message]
2022-10-02 21:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-02 23:00 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2022-10-02 9:56 ` [RFC PATCH 5/5] efi: esrt: Omit region sanity check when no memory map is available Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-02 16:27 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2022-10-02 21:43 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-10-03 8:41 ` Ard Biesheuvel
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=Yzm8H3iS7ziWsh7E@itl-email \
--to=demi@invisiblethingslab.com \
--cc=anton@enomsg.org \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=ccross@android.com \
--cc=jgross@suse.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com \
--cc=oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com \
--cc=pjones@redhat.com \
--cc=sstabellini@kernel.org \
--cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox