From: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
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Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Xiongwei Song <xiongwei.song@windriver.com>,
Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
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Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
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"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
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Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Changbin Du <changbin.du@huawei.com>,
Huang Shijie <shijie@os.amperecomputing.com>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv7 01/16] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 11:00:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <af700e33-5c73-40aa-96a3-91cd8bf64871@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250625125112.3943745-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
On 6/25/2025 5:50 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
>
> Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) is a security feature that
> intends to prevent malicious virtual address space accesses across
> user/kernel mode.
>
> Such mode based access protection already exists today with paging and
> features such as SMEP and SMAP. However, to enforce these protections,
> the processor must traverse the paging structures in memory. Malicious
> software can use timing information resulting from this traversal to
> determine details about the paging structures, and these details may
> also be used to determine the layout of the kernel memory.
>
> The LASS mechanism provides the same mode-based protections as paging
> but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections
> enforced by LASS are applied before paging, software will not be able to
> derive paging-based timing information from the various caching
> structures such as the TLBs, mid-level caches, page walker, data caches,
> etc.
>
> LASS enforcement relies on the typical kernel implementation to divide
> the 64-bit virtual address space into two halves:
> Addr[63]=0 -> User address space
> Addr[63]=1 -> Kernel address space
>
> Any data access or code execution across address spaces typically
> results in a #GP fault.
>
> The LASS enforcement for kernel data access is dependent on CR4.SMAP
> being set. The enforcement can be disabled by toggling the RFLAGS.AC bit
> similar to SMAP.
>
> Define the CPU feature bits to enumerate this feature and include
> feature dependencies to reflect the same.
>
> LASS provides protection against a class of speculative attacks, such as
> SLAM[1]. Add the "lass" flag to /proc/cpuinfo to indicate that the feature
> is supported by hardware and enabled by the kernel. This allows userspace
> to determine if the setup is secure against such attacks.
>
> [1] https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf
>
> Co-developed-by: Yian Chen <yian.chen@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yian Chen <yian.chen@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures | 4 ++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 1 +
> tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures
> index 250c10627ab3..733d5aff2456 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures
> @@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ config X86_DISABLED_FEATURE_PCID
> def_bool y
> depends on !X86_64
>
> +config X86_DISABLED_FEATURE_LASS
> + def_bool y
> + depends on X86_32
> +
> config X86_DISABLED_FEATURE_PKU
> def_bool y
> depends on !X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index b78af55aa22e..8eef1ad7aca2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -313,6 +313,7 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_SM4 (12*32+ 2) /* SM4 instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* "avx_vnni" AVX VNNI instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* "avx512_bf16" AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_LASS (12*32+ 6) /* "lass" Linear Address Space Separation */
> #define X86_FEATURE_CMPCCXADD (12*32+ 7) /* CMPccXADD instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON_EXT (12*32+ 8) /* Intel Architectural PerfMon Extension */
> #define X86_FEATURE_FZRM (12*32+10) /* Fast zero-length REP MOVSB */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> index f1a4adc78272..81d0c8bf1137 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> @@ -136,6 +136,8 @@
> #define X86_CR4_PKE _BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
> #define X86_CR4_CET_BIT 23 /* enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology */
> #define X86_CR4_CET _BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
> +#define X86_CR4_LASS_BIT 27 /* enable Linear Address Space Separation support */
> +#define X86_CR4_LASS _BITUL(X86_CR4_LASS_BIT)
> #define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT 28 /* LAM for supervisor pointers */
> #define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP _BITUL(X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> index 46efcbd6afa4..98d0cdd82574 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
> { X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES },
> { X86_FEATURE_FRED, X86_FEATURE_LKGS },
> { X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL },
> + { X86_FEATURE_LASS, X86_FEATURE_SMAP },
> {}
> };
>
> diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index ee176236c2be..4473a6f7800b 100644
> --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -313,6 +313,7 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_SM4 (12*32+ 2) /* SM4 instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* "avx_vnni" AVX VNNI instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* "avx512_bf16" AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_LASS (12*32+ 6) /* "lass" Linear Address Space Separation */
> #define X86_FEATURE_CMPCCXADD (12*32+ 7) /* CMPccXADD instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON_EXT (12*32+ 8) /* Intel Architectural PerfMon Extension */
> #define X86_FEATURE_FZRM (12*32+10) /* Fast zero-length REP MOVSB */
Reviewed-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-26 18:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-25 12:50 [PATCHv7 00/16] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:50 ` [PATCHv7 01/16] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-26 15:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-06-26 18:00 ` Xin Li [this message]
2025-06-25 12:50 ` [PATCH] x86/vsyscall: Do not require X86_PF_INSTR to emulate vsyscall Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:55 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:50 ` [PATCHv7 02/16] x86/asm: Introduce inline memcpy and memset Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:50 ` [PATCHv7 03/16] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-26 13:49 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-06-26 14:18 ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-27 10:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:50 ` [PATCHv7 04/16] x86/cpu: Defer CR pinning setup until after EFI initialization Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:50 ` [PATCHv7 05/16] efi: Disable LASS around set_virtual_address_map() EFI call Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:50 ` [PATCHv7 06/16] x86/vsyscall: Do not require X86_PF_INSTR to emulate vsyscall Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:51 ` [PATCHv7 07/16] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the #PF emulation code Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:51 ` [PATCHv7 08/16] x86/traps: Consolidate user fixups in exc_general_protection() Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:51 ` [PATCHv7 09/16] x86/vsyscall: Add vsyscall emulation for #GP Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:51 ` [PATCHv7 10/16] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:51 ` [PATCHv7 11/16] x86/cpu: Set LASS CR4 bit as pinning sensitive Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:51 ` [PATCHv7 12/16] x86/traps: Communicate a LASS violation in #GP message Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:51 ` [PATCHv7 13/16] x86/traps: Handle LASS thrown #SS Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-26 17:57 ` Xin Li
2025-06-27 10:31 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-30 8:30 ` David Laight
2025-06-30 9:50 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:51 ` [PATCHv7 14/16] x86/cpu: Make LAM depend on LASS Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:51 ` [PATCHv7 15/16] x86/cpu: Enable LASS during CPU initialization Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-25 12:51 ` [PATCHv7 16/16] x86: Re-enable Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-26 9:22 ` [PATCHv7 00/16] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support Vegard Nossum
2025-06-26 9:35 ` Vegard Nossum
2025-06-26 12:47 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-06-26 13:15 ` Vegard Nossum
2025-06-29 11:40 ` David Laight
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