From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: James Morris Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 03:22:41 +0400 (+04) Message-ID: References: <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <150842466996.7923.17995994984545441369.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Return-path: In-Reply-To: <150842466996.7923.17995994984545441369.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: David Howells Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jforbes@redhat.com List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 19 Oct 2017, David Howells wrote: > From: Matthew Garrett > > kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which > is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable > kexec in this situation. > > This does not affect kexec_file_load() which can check for a signature on the > image to be booted. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett > Signed-off-by: David Howells > Acked-by: Dave Young > cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Reviewed-by: James Morris -- James Morris