From: James Morris <jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
gnomes-qBU/x9rampVanCEyBjwyrvXRex20P6io@public.gmane.org,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org,
gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
keyrings-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2017 07:55:54 +1000 (AEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1704070755010.27111@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <32240.1491475400-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
On Thu, 6 Apr 2017, David Howells wrote:
> James Morris <jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>
> > > +static __read_mostly bool kernel_locked_down;
> >
> > How about marking this __ro_after_init if ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT is not
> > configured?
>
> I guess lock_kernel_down() would need to be __init also in that case.
Ideally, yes.
>
> Also, the implementation of lift_kernel_lockdown() should be conditional on
> CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT.
>
> David
>
--
James Morris
<jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-06 21:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-05 17:09 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
[not found] ` <149141221365.31282.16276273075946694481.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-06 8:44 ` James Morris
2017-04-06 10:43 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <32240.1491475400-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-06 21:55 ` James Morris [this message]
[not found] ` <149141219387.31282.6648284836568938717.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-04-05 19:57 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-06 8:25 ` James Morris
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells
[not found] ` <149141232449.31282.15045536717220570492.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-05 17:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
[not found] ` <alpine.LRH.2.20.1704061823520.12226-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-06 8:37 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-04-05 20:14 David Howells
[not found] ` <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
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