From: Anisse Astier <anisse@astier.eu>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] efivarfs: Cache occupied and available space
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 18:01:01 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <anILrU83ClMOZ6hO@PF620VM5> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260801144258.15977-2-ardb@kernel.org>
Hi Ard,
Please find a few comments below,
On Sat, Aug 01, 2026 at 04:42:59PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Ravi reports that statfs() may be called by unprivileged users on the
> efivarfs mount point, resulting in repeated calls to QueryVariableInfo()
> which are disproportionately costly on x86 systems where the variable
> store is backed by SMM, as each SMM entry requires a rendez-vous of all
> the CPUs.
>
> So cache the output of QueryVariableInfo(), and invalidate the cached
> values when an entry is added or deleted, or the variable store is
> synchronized after a suspend/resume sequence.
>
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Reported-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
> Fixes: d86ff3333cb1 ("efivarfs: expose used and total size")
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> ---
> fs/efivarfs/internal.h | 2 ++
> fs/efivarfs/super.c | 21 +++++++++++---------
> fs/efivarfs/vars.c | 9 +++++++++
> 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/efivarfs/internal.h b/fs/efivarfs/internal.h
> index f913b6824289..d43789bc7839 100644
> --- a/fs/efivarfs/internal.h
> +++ b/fs/efivarfs/internal.h
> @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ struct efivar_entry {
> bool removed;
> };
>
> +extern u64 efivar_storage_space, efivar_remaining_space;
> +
> static inline struct efivar_entry *efivar_entry(struct inode *inode)
> {
> return container_of(inode, struct efivar_entry, vfs_inode);
> diff --git a/fs/efivarfs/super.c b/fs/efivarfs/super.c
> index 733c19571f1c..3691a2a087a0 100644
> --- a/fs/efivarfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/efivarfs/super.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
> #include "internal.h"
> #include "../internal.h"
>
> +u64 efivar_storage_space, efivar_remaining_space;
> +
Since those are globals (before they were only local to the function),
I'd put them behind a lock now, probably efivar_lock, because we need
something that's globally available.
statfs could be raced from userspace vs the rest of the code; and
efivar_invalidate_cached_storage_space is only called outside the lock.
> static int efivarfs_ops_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
> void *data)
> {
> @@ -82,15 +84,16 @@ static int efivarfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
> const u32 attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
> EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
> EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS;
> - u64 storage_space, remaining_space, max_variable_size;
> u64 id = huge_encode_dev(dentry->d_sb->s_dev);
> + u64 max_variable_size;
> efi_status_t status;
>
> /* Some UEFI firmware does not implement QueryVariableInfo() */
> - storage_space = remaining_space = 0;
> - if (efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO)) {
> - status = efivar_query_variable_info(attr, &storage_space,
> - &remaining_space,
> + if (efivar_storage_space == 0 &&
> + efivar_remaining_space == 0 &&
> + efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO)) {
> + status = efivar_query_variable_info(attr, &efivar_storage_space,
> + &efivar_remaining_space,
> &max_variable_size);
> if (status != EFI_SUCCESS && status != EFI_UNSUPPORTED)
> pr_warn_ratelimited("query_variable_info() failed: 0x%lx\n",
We've had issues with firmware in the past, shouldn't we be a bit more
defensive here in case of errors? I'd reset both variables on error in
case an incomplete write to one of the variables gives us an invalid state.
> @@ -104,8 +107,8 @@ static int efivarfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
> */
> buf->f_bsize = 1;
> buf->f_namelen = NAME_MAX;
> - buf->f_blocks = storage_space;
> - buf->f_bfree = remaining_space;
> + buf->f_blocks = efivar_storage_space;
> + buf->f_bfree = efivar_remaining_space;
> buf->f_type = dentry->d_sb->s_magic;
> buf->f_fsid = u64_to_fsid(id);
>
> @@ -114,8 +117,8 @@ static int efivarfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
> * when the storage_paranoia x86 quirk is active. To use more, users
> * should boot the kernel with efi_no_storage_paranoia.
> */
> - if (remaining_space > efivar_reserved_space())
> - buf->f_bavail = remaining_space - efivar_reserved_space();
> + if (efivar_remaining_space > efivar_reserved_space())
> + buf->f_bavail = efivar_remaining_space - efivar_reserved_space();
> else
> buf->f_bavail = 0;
>
> diff --git a/fs/efivarfs/vars.c b/fs/efivarfs/vars.c
> index 6833c3d24b54..4196963695bd 100644
> --- a/fs/efivarfs/vars.c
> +++ b/fs/efivarfs/vars.c
> @@ -361,6 +361,11 @@ static void dup_variable_bug(efi_char16_t *str16, efi_guid_t *vendor_guid,
> kfree(str8);
> }
>
> +static void efivar_invalidate_cached_storage_space(void)
> +{
> + efivar_storage_space = efivar_remaining_space = 0;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * efivar_init - build the initial list of EFI variables
> * @func: callback function to invoke for every variable
> @@ -450,6 +455,7 @@ int efivar_init(int (*func)(efi_char16_t *, efi_guid_t, unsigned long, void *),
> } while (status != EFI_NOT_FOUND);
>
> efivar_unlock();
> + efivar_invalidate_cached_storage_space();
> free:
> kfree(variable_name);
>
> @@ -480,6 +486,8 @@ int efivar_entry_delete(struct efivar_entry *entry)
> &entry->var.VendorGuid,
> 0, 0, NULL, false);
> efivar_unlock();
> + efivar_invalidate_cached_storage_space();
> +
> if (!(status == EFI_SUCCESS || status == EFI_NOT_FOUND))
> return efi_status_to_err(status);
>
> @@ -620,6 +628,7 @@ int efivar_entry_set_get_size(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes,
> NULL, size, NULL);
>
> efivar_unlock();
> + efivar_invalidate_cached_storage_space();
In this function, the error path for efi_set_variable_locked (that could
have triggered an EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) is not covered by the
invalidation.
>
> if (status && status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
> return efi_status_to_err(status);
> --
Couldn't the variables be written outside of efivarfs as well?
efivar_set_variable can be called from other code? pstore could maybe be
ignored if it's only used during crashes (I'm not sure), but I see at
least one other driver calling it as well. Wouldn't that change the
available/free size?
Regards,
Anisse
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-04 16:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-01 14:42 [PATCH] efivarfs: Cache occupied and available space Ard Biesheuvel
2026-08-04 10:02 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-08-04 16:01 ` Anisse Astier [this message]
2026-08-17 12:11 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-08-17 13:26 ` Anisse Astier
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