From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795019456; b=D6oQC/OZCBSvnX0d5pc9vZHwMrccA92rTmAIXBjc1MMMA+eGbIdtAEUJsFSnuX1ZPnMv HrbsWNlWhVldlVlJcsK9CK5tkEzRpnMqVBaAWxg8OLIXMcBfXWvMe+RoxKGUgkRseW/8F Cs5okhil+woEi4LHXtaDywQywvWtDHer2D8lu61bMRae/+xVdgfEmboTe4cThfYp/jy/d FeR+PIaBy55gpdc14PZUJwxNJtc7rdTFWFsauuIztfg7YaTJ2gTcDiZV5sC4c6EIzfiP7 Zys0bHLKwSZOnVH39MNMXkI+HskqecMaNxwXMg+ryAfF9Has3eMzEiOFqH554MdUhjA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795019456; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=V8EfCcQQuKQgYuNV+U25OJIYzPXqlQ48YSyRVImINN4=; b=CIPBS6mXZG9F91kpCxxP1JyRdcVGN5L5YBl+VM21y0xB1Mx6Y5t1HhPbUzjTZ35w7pNK wadS9p15ocWslJGzn/UxWpMMaCbfKxSeI6lWmuGcZQ26W5MUQF6KM8CAFgu1o/ZgCxA++ feqP6MDfwcMFRPlNrUwQRoLb/g0FSzS+CQ5JPSH5m8lwzxwTRnpyuEM4xGGq3aVwOiWFR JjrfMZ7r9agUTrt1TguPN8+rEsEKCs9d8/yi/e8N4sAk8pCV4+w/yeKoBo+28E92VSIJI b6JjH27NbzHg2LFRIeGglcIYsHfb07NJUj2kyTBVh5PfK6zp8zpYKa1ApHE5PFbTmqw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=LL8pNEpw; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPS id 87AF1606A7ED; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:30:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=LL8pNEpw Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id 9EA0C1F000C5; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:30:55 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795019456; bh=V8EfCcQQuKQgYuNV+U25OJIYzPXqlQ48YSyRVImINN4=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=LL8pNEpwqA/UXeLxj72+eBHPxZvLqWPADu5si/lCYb7xohJv0s5TNymNRFIlQnveK ttk1SqLivpJHr2DPClSTwST4zbmlIchuTTyXHMwLOEuy2TRjBXuj4STsaum4ev7JgL Uzy2SjviPCrP1TdbIDr9hBojA+9Yiv6wV8kgeyp+mPZhJvU19xcX4dyOcxq2lG4wub mBPrxrAb0opx/TBx/g0yelnoMdD/rx/+Rzsk6VELp2eiM5ZBUtweD/y2kJo1BzA9PN GKxYLgogiVErEkMTcLpqNDRwCrRiXW0Z53JZ4Gy4/YsH6UIPIetfOEMd4eAi9RmEag 5rEDZMutIqM3g== Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 18:30:52 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: James Bottomley Cc: Matthew Garrett , Matthew Garrett , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, rafael@kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/17] tpm: Define a kernel-owned TPM NV index that can't be modified by userland Message-ID: References: <20261008132532.1155166-1-matthewg@nvidia.com> <20261008132532.1155166-2-matthewg@nvidia.com> <435907614242e82ecde1767a967a3110fca6fb37.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <059384e86fd256618498b9a7214b6421d38fdf1f.camel@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 11:06:55AM -0500, James Bottomley wrote: > The better mechanisms to address this are probably: > > 1. Detect that PCR5 has been disrupted (get the kernel to store the > on-boot value and check they match) and if so refuse signed > suspend to disk with a message (this is easy). > 2. Capture the additional writes to PCR5 and store them as part of > the attestation so the resuming system can prove the current boot > value of PCR5 matches the attested one when the additional > extends are replayed (this is a bit more complex). (2) is a great suggestion IMHO; did not cross my mind. That approach would also help to debug any possible issues. I think it also might make sense to drift away from kernel config flag to kernel-command line parameter when it comes to pre-existing integrity code. It's time consuming to test and improve right now. > > Regards, > > James Br, Jarkko