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charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable User-Agent: Evolution 3.56.2 X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 [Matthew seems preoccupied, so let me try] On Sun, 2026-11-15 at 17:15 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Sun, Oct 11, 2026 at 04:28:33AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > On Sun, Oct 11, 2026 at 12:27:58PM +0200, James Bottomley wrote: > > > On Sun, 2026-10-11 at 03:23 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > > Hmm. Well, that's irritating. Which year's XPS is this? > > >=20 > > > It's an XPS-13 9380 Core i7 ... circa 2019 I think. > >=20 > > Yes, that's definitely later than I hoped. Bother. I think this > > patchset is probably still worthwhile because it does unblock us on > > at least some machines, and the implementation is intended to be > > opaque (other than the change in PCR 5 measurements, but we should > > still get log replay) and can be replaced with something else if we > > want. The other approach that springs to mind is tying this to > > having distros switch to a new kernel signing key before enabling > > this and so having PCR 7 be associated with the feature, but that > > sounds like an incredibly tedious thing to get right in a reliable > > way. >=20 > What prevents blocking PCR 5 access from /dev/tpm*? If firmware > already, does it, this can only add defense-in-depth. Nothing does, but what's the concern? A random user writing to PCR5 to disrupt the validity of the next suspend image? This is already an existing problem for binding secrets release to any secure boot PCRs. However, if we start blocking access to secure boot PCRs, there's a high likelihood of unforeseen consequences (like interfering with unlock once secrets that do capping writes to PCRs to prevent subsequent releases). The better mechanisms to address this are probably: 1. Detect that PCR5 has been disrupted (get the kernel to store the on-boot value and check they match) and if so refuse signed suspend to disk with a message (this is easy). 2. Capture the additional writes to PCR5 and store them as part of the attestation so the resuming system can prove the current boot value of PCR5 matches the attested one when the additional extends are replayed (this is a bit more complex). Regards, James