From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
ardb@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, mic@digikod.net,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, stefanb@linux.ibm.com,
ebiggers@kernel.org, rdunlap@infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/13] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 19:16:32 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cc7e23de36edb50999cfd9c8dd6acc9d5962a479.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241017155516.2582369-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
On Thu, 2024-10-17 at 09:55 -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Introduce system_key_link(), a new function to allow a keyring to
> link
> to a key contained within one of the system keyrings (builtin,
> secondary,
> or platform). Depending on how the kernel is built, if the machine
> keyring is available, it will be checked as well, since it is linked
> to
> the secondary keyring. If the asymmetric key id matches a key within
> one
> of these system keyrings, the matching key is linked into the passed
> in
> keyring.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> ---
> certs/system_keyring.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/keys/system_keyring.h | 7 ++++++-
> 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
> index e344cee10d28..4abee7514442 100644
> --- a/certs/system_keyring.c
> +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
> static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys;
/*
* Explain system_trusted_keys (nothing too detailed, only the gist)
*/
> +#define system_trusted_keys secondary_trusted_keys
> +#else
> +#define system_trusted_keys builtin_trusted_keys
> #endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
> static struct key *machine_trusted_keys;
We have enough these to make this quite convoluted so let's put some
helpful reminders. I would forget this in no time ;-) So if it comes
down to that, please put something because I have a goldfish memory.
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-17 16:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-17 15:55 [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/13] certs: Remove CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING check Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 16:50 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-12-23 13:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/13] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2024-10-17 16:53 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-12-23 16:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/13] clavis: Introduce a new system keyring called clavis Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 20:34 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 21:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-24 0:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:27 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-05 11:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/13] keys: Add new verification type (VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE) Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 19:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 21:42 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 21:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-24 0:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:28 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/13] clavis: Introduce a new key type called clavis_key_acl Eric Snowberg
2024-10-18 5:21 ` Ben Boeckel
2024-10-18 15:42 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-18 16:55 ` Ben Boeckel
2024-10-18 21:55 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/13] clavis: Populate clavis keyring acl with kernel module signature Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 19:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/13] keys: Add ability to track intended usage of the public key Eric Snowberg
2025-02-06 20:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-07 23:09 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-02-12 12:42 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/13] clavis: Introduce new LSM called clavis Eric Snowberg
2024-10-23 2:25 ` sergeh
2024-10-23 19:25 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-24 19:57 ` sergeh
2024-12-24 17:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:32 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-05 12:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/13] clavis: Allow user to define acl at build time Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/13] efi: Make clavis boot param persist across kexec Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/13] clavis: Prevent boot param change during kexec Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/13] clavis: Add function redirection for Kunit support Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/13] clavis: " Eric Snowberg
2024-12-24 1:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-12-23 12:09 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:14 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-04 4:48 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06 3:40 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06 17:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-02-27 20:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-02-27 22:22 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 14:08 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-02-28 16:14 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 17:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-03 22:38 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-04 12:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 0:19 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 1:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 2:09 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 2:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 2:24 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 17:51 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-03 22:40 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-04 14:46 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-05 0:23 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 21:29 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-06 1:12 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-06 22:28 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-07 2:46 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-20 16:24 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-20 21:36 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 16:37 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 18:57 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 21:20 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 22:13 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 22:56 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-22 2:00 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 17:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-21 19:05 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-20 22:40 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-21 16:40 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 16:55 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-21 20:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 20:53 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-24 17:44 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 17:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-04 22:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-05 0:25 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 0:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-01 2:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-01 2:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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