From: ross.philipson@oracle.com
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
peterhuewe@gmx.de, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net, ebiederm@xmission.com,
dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com,
kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 08/19] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2025 11:33:06 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fbb6349f-4195-4d83-8d51-99bb91ea4fe0@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Z8qXVLiab5L-XkgP@kernel.org>
On 3/6/25 10:51 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 19, 2024 at 11:42:05AM -0800, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> The MLE (measured launch environment) header must be locatable by the
>> boot loader and TXT must be setup to do a launch with this header's
>
> (cutting the hairs) nit: /TXT/Intel TXT/
>
>> location. While the offset to the kernel_info structure does not need
>> to be at a fixed offset, the offsets in the header must be relative
>> offsets from the start of the setup kernel. The support in the linker
>> file achieves this.
>
> This is too obfuscated and also sort of misses the action taken by
> the patch.
>
> I presume the goal here is to add relative offset to the MLE header?
> Please state that explicitly.
>
> Like for any possible kernel patch:
>
> 1. Come out clean 110% transparent.
> 2. Full exposure what you're doing.
>
> ;-)
>
> That's the fastest possible path to actual results.
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
>> Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
>> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 ++++
>> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
>> index f818ee8fba38..a0604a0d1756 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
>> @@ -1,12 +1,20 @@
>> /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
>>
>> +#include <linux/linkage.h>
>> #include <asm/bootparam.h>
>>
>> - .section ".rodata.kernel_info", "a"
>> +/*
>> + * The kernel_info structure is not placed at a fixed offest in the
>> + * kernel image. So this macro and the support in the linker file
>> + * allow the relative offsets for the MLE header within the kernel
>> + * image to be configured at build time.
>> + */
>> +#define roffset(X) ((X) - kernel_info)
>>
>> - .global kernel_info
>> + .section ".rodata.kernel_info", "a"
>>
>> -kernel_info:
>> + .balign 16
>> +SYM_DATA_START(kernel_info)
>> /* Header, Linux top (structure). */
>> .ascii "LToP"
>> /* Size. */
>> @@ -17,6 +25,40 @@ kernel_info:
>> /* Maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs. */
>> .long SETUP_TYPE_MAX
>>
>> + /* Offset to the MLE header structure */
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
>> + .long roffset(mle_header_offset)
>> +#else
>> + .long 0
>> +#endif
>> +
>> kernel_info_var_len_data:
>> /* Empty for time being... */
>> -kernel_info_end:
>> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(kernel_info, SYM_L_LOCAL, kernel_info_end)
>> +
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
>> + /*
>> + * The MLE Header per the TXT Specification, section 2.1
>> + * MLE capabilities, see table 4. Capabilities set:
>> + * bit 0: Support for GETSEC[WAKEUP] for RLP wakeup
>> + * bit 1: Support for RLP wakeup using MONITOR address
>> + * bit 2: The ECX register will contain the pointer to the MLE page table
>> + * bit 5: TPM 1.2 family: Details/authorities PCR usage support
>> + * bit 9: Supported format of TPM 2.0 event log - TCG compliant
>> + */
>> +SYM_DATA_START(mle_header)
>> + .long 0x9082ac5a /* UUID0 */
>> + .long 0x74a7476f /* UUID1 */
>> + .long 0xa2555c0f /* UUID2 */
>> + .long 0x42b651cb /* UUID3 */
>> + .long 0x00000034 /* MLE header size */
>> + .long 0x00020002 /* MLE version 2.2 */
>> + .long roffset(sl_stub_entry_offset) /* Linear entry point of MLE (virt. address) */
>> + .long 0x00000000 /* First valid page of MLE */
>> + .long 0x00000000 /* Offset within binary of first byte of MLE */
>> + .long roffset(_edata_offset) /* Offset within binary of last byte + 1 of MLE */
>> + .long 0x00000227 /* Bit vector of MLE-supported capabilities */
>> + .long 0x00000000 /* Starting linear address of command line (unused) */
>> + .long 0x00000000 /* Ending linear address of command line (unused) */
>
> Nit: I'd consider aligning these to few tab offsets after even tho it
> might cause checkpatch complain (which is fine when there are legitimite
> reasons to do so).
>
> Would be easier to read.
>
>> +SYM_DATA_END(mle_header)
>> +#endif
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S
>> index 083ec6d7722a..f82184801462 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S
>> @@ -118,3 +118,10 @@ SECTIONS
>> }
>> ASSERT(SIZEOF(.rela.dyn) == 0, "Unexpected run-time relocations (.rela) detected!")
>> }
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> +PROVIDE(kernel_info_offset = ABSOLUTE(kernel_info - startup_32));
>> +PROVIDE(mle_header_offset = kernel_info_offset + ABSOLUTE(mle_header - startup_32));
>> +PROVIDE(sl_stub_entry_offset = kernel_info_offset + ABSOLUTE(sl_stub_entry - startup_32));
>> +PROVIDE(_edata_offset = kernel_info_offset + ABSOLUTE(_edata - startup_32));
>
> I'd enumerate these one by one in the commit message. I.e. what is added
> explicitly.
Everything you say here makes sense, we can incorporate these changes.
Thanks
Ross
>
>> +#endif
>> --
>> 2.39.3
>>
>
> BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-07 19:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-19 19:41 [PATCH v12 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:41 ` [PATCH v12 01/19] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 5:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-19 19:41 ` [PATCH v12 02/19] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:22 ` ross.philipson
2025-03-07 19:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:44 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 04/19] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:25 ` ross.philipson
2025-03-07 19:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:46 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 05/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 5:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:29 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 08/19] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 6:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:33 ` ross.philipson [this message]
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:42 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 10/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:43 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 11/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 12/19] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 13/19] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 14/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 15/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:35 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 16/19] tpm, tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 17/19] tpm, sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2025-03-07 7:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-07 19:39 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 18/19] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-12-19 19:42 ` [PATCH v12 19/19] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2025-02-18 18:21 ` [PATCH v12 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support ross.philipson
2025-02-18 18:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-18 19:39 ` ross.philipson
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=fbb6349f-4195-4d83-8d51-99bb91ea4fe0@oracle.com \
--to=ross.philipson@oracle.com \
--cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
--cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=baolu.lu@linux.intel.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com \
--cc=dwmw2@infradead.org \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=jgg@ziepe.ca \
--cc=kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com \
--cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=mjg59@srcf.ucam.org \
--cc=nivedita@alum.mit.edu \
--cc=peterhuewe@gmx.de \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox