From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Ext4 Developers List <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: jaegeuk@kernel.org, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] ext4 crypto: get rid of ci_mode from struct ext4_crypt_info
Date: Tue, 12 May 2015 14:59:50 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1431457192-3432-3-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1431457192-3432-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu>
The ci_mode field was superfluous, and getting rid of it gets rid of
an unused hole in the structure.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
---
fs/ext4/crypto.c | 11 +++++------
fs/ext4/crypto_fname.c | 4 ++--
fs/ext4/crypto_key.c | 11 +++++------
fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h | 1 -
4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/crypto.c b/fs/ext4/crypto.c
index 1c34f0e..9969d05 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/crypto.c
@@ -137,14 +137,13 @@ struct ext4_crypto_ctx *ext4_get_crypto_ctx(struct inode *inode)
/* Allocate a new Crypto API context if we don't already have
* one or if it isn't the right mode. */
- BUG_ON(ci->ci_mode == EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID);
- if (ctx->tfm && (ctx->mode != ci->ci_mode)) {
+ if (ctx->tfm && (ctx->mode != ci->ci_data_mode)) {
crypto_free_tfm(ctx->tfm);
ctx->tfm = NULL;
ctx->mode = EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID;
}
if (!ctx->tfm) {
- switch (ci->ci_mode) {
+ switch (ci->ci_data_mode) {
case EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS:
ctx->tfm = crypto_ablkcipher_tfm(
crypto_alloc_ablkcipher("xts(aes)", 0, 0));
@@ -162,9 +161,9 @@ struct ext4_crypto_ctx *ext4_get_crypto_ctx(struct inode *inode)
ctx->tfm = NULL;
goto out;
}
- ctx->mode = ci->ci_mode;
+ ctx->mode = ci->ci_data_mode;
}
- BUG_ON(ci->ci_size != ext4_encryption_key_size(ci->ci_mode));
+ BUG_ON(ci->ci_size != ext4_encryption_key_size(ci->ci_data_mode));
/* There shouldn't be a bounce page attached to the crypto
* context at this point. */
@@ -321,7 +320,7 @@ static int ext4_page_crypto(struct ext4_crypto_ctx *ctx,
int res = 0;
BUG_ON(!ctx->tfm);
- BUG_ON(ctx->mode != ei->i_crypt_info->ci_mode);
+ BUG_ON(ctx->mode != ei->i_crypt_info->ci_data_mode);
if (ctx->mode != EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
diff --git a/fs/ext4/crypto_fname.c b/fs/ext4/crypto_fname.c
index 374d0e7..e63dd29 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/crypto_fname.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/crypto_fname.c
@@ -272,9 +272,9 @@ int ext4_setup_fname_crypto(struct inode *inode)
if (!ci || ci->ci_ctfm)
return 0;
- if (ci->ci_mode != EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS) {
+ if (ci->ci_filename_mode != EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS) {
printk_once(KERN_WARNING "ext4: unsupported key mode %d\n",
- ci->ci_mode);
+ ci->ci_filename_mode);
return -ENOKEY;
}
diff --git a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
index d6abe46..858d7d6 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
@@ -152,14 +152,13 @@ int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
- crypt_info->ci_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
+ crypt_info->ci_size =
+ ext4_encryption_key_size(crypt_info->ci_data_mode);
else if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
- crypt_info->ci_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
- else {
- printk(KERN_ERR "ext4 crypto: Unsupported inode type.\n");
+ crypt_info->ci_size =
+ ext4_encryption_key_size(crypt_info->ci_filename_mode);
+ else
BUG();
- }
- crypt_info->ci_size = ext4_encryption_key_size(crypt_info->ci_mode);
BUG_ON(!crypt_info->ci_size);
if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi)) {
memset(crypt_info->ci_raw, 0x42, EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h b/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h
index d29687c..69faf0e 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h
@@ -74,7 +74,6 @@ struct ext4_encryption_key {
} __attribute__((__packed__));
struct ext4_crypt_info {
- unsigned char ci_mode;
unsigned char ci_size;
char ci_data_mode;
char ci_filename_mode;
--
2.3.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-05-12 19:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-05-12 18:59 [PATCH 1/5] ext4: clean up superblock encryption mode fields Theodore Ts'o
2015-05-12 18:59 ` [PATCH 2/5] ext4 crypto: use slab caches Theodore Ts'o
2015-05-12 18:59 ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2015-05-12 18:59 ` [PATCH 4/5] ext4 crypto: shrink size of the ext4_crypto_ctx structure Theodore Ts'o
2015-05-12 18:59 ` [PATCH 5/5] ext4 crypto: require CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR if ext4 encryption is enabled Theodore Ts'o
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