From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jaegeuk Kim Subject: Re: [PATCH] fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policy Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 21:03:35 -0700 Message-ID: <20160910040335.GA34151@jaegeuk> References: <1473357429-134444-1-git-send-email-ebiggers@google.com> <20160910033759.qsvg4loedccqc7if@thunk.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: Eric Biggers , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs@vger.kernel.org To: Theodore Ts'o Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20160910033759.qsvg4loedccqc7if@thunk.org> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-ext4.vger.kernel.org On Fri, Sep 09, 2016 at 11:37:59PM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > On Thu, Sep 08, 2016 at 10:57:08AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > On an ext4 or f2fs filesystem with file encryption supported, a user > > could set an encryption policy on any empty directory(*) to which they > > had readonly access. This is obviously problematic, since such a > > directory might be owned by another user and the new encryption policy > > would prevent that other user from creating files in their own directory > > (for example). > > > > Fix this by requiring inode_owner_or_capable() permission to set an > > encryption policy. This means that either the caller must own the file, > > or the caller must have the capability CAP_FOWNER. > > > > (*) Or also on any regular file, for f2fs v4.6 and later and ext4 > > v4.8-rc1 and later; a separate bug fix is coming for that. > > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+; check fs/{ext4,f2fs} > > Thanks, applied. (Jaeguk, I plan to send this to Linus via the > ext4.git tree as a fix for v4.8) Sure, no problem. > > - Ted