From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
To: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: linux-ext4 <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ext4: forbid encrypting root directory
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 10:54:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616175457.GA20865@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <F7BF6774-18AA-4A57-AF64-D7D125A7E73C@dilger.ca>
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:02:05PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> >>
> >> What about a special case to handle an unencrypted lost+found inode?
> >>
> >> There was also a patch series a while ago to explicitly add lost+found
> >> into the superblock so that it could be found even if the root directory
> >> was corrupted, and to allow flexibility in whether it is always shown in
> >> the root directory or not (e.g. allowing ".lost+found" or similar).
> >
> > It could be done if the lost+found inode was not linked to from any directory
> > and instead had its inode number stored in the superblock so that e2fsck could
> > still find it. However, if e2fsck put files in a lost+found directory that
> > doesn't exist in the filesystem directory structure, how would users retrieve
> > those files? Would users be required to run a special e2fsprogs command to
> > list/read/delete the files in lost+found?
>
> I was thinking that readdir on the root inode could insert the "lost+found"
> or ".lost+found" entry dynamically,
I think this is possible, but not trivial. It's not just readdir; ->lookup()
would also have to special-case lookups of "lost+found", and we'd have to
override the fscrypt_permitted_context() check. It would also have to be a
RO_COMPAT filesystem feature, lest an unaware ext4 driver or e2fsprogs create a
lost+found directory which would then be ambiguous with the "real" one.
> or (a bit less pleasant) is to add a
> special case that this entry is just never encrypted (could compare the
> inode number to the one stored in the superblock, instead of comparing names)?
I think that would be similarly difficult, as it would still require special
logic in readdir and ->lookup(), and would still require a RO_COMPAT filesystem
feature.
Either way, not all filesystems will have the implicit "lost+found" directory
feature, so we're still going to need to forbid encrypting the root directory on
some filesystems anyway.
Eric
prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-16 17:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-14 23:17 [PATCH] ext4: forbid encrypting root directory Eric Biggers
2017-06-15 0:00 ` Andreas Dilger
2017-06-15 0:24 ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-15 2:02 ` Andreas Dilger
2017-06-16 17:54 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
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