From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
To: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>,
linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] ext4: add sanity check for encryption + DAX
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2017 08:45:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170912064500.GC16554@quack2.suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170912050526.7627-4-ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
On Mon 11-09-17 23:05:24, Ross Zwisler wrote:
> We prevent DAX from being used on inodes which are using ext4's built in
> encryption via a check in ext4_set_inode_flags(). We do have what appears
> to be an unsafe transition of S_DAX in ext4_set_context(), though, where
> S_DAX can get disabled without us doing a proper writeback + invalidate.
>
> There are also issues with mm-level races when changing the value of S_DAX,
> as well as issues with the VM_MIXEDMAP flag:
>
> https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-xfs/msg09859.html
>
> I actually think we are safe in this case because of the following:
>
> 1) You can't encrypt an existing file. Encryption can only be set on an
> empty directory, with new inodes in that directory being created with
> encryption turned on, so I don't think it's possible to turn encryption on
> for a file that has open DAX mmaps or outstanding I/Os.
>
> 2) There is no way to turn encryption off on a given file. Once an inode
> is encrypted, it stays encrypted for the life of that inode, so we don't
> have to worry about the case where we turn encryption off and S_DAX
> suddenly turns on.
>
> 3) The only way we end up in ext4_set_context() to turn on encryption is
> when we are creating a new file in the encrypted directory. This happens
> as part of ext4_create() before the inode has been allowed to do any I/O.
> Here's the call tree:
>
> ext4_create()
> __ext4_new_inode()
> ext4_set_inode_flags() // sets S_DAX
> fscrypt_inherit_context()
> fscrypt_get_encryption_info();
> ext4_set_context() // sets EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT, clears S_DAX
>
> So, I actually think it's safe to transition S_DAX in ext4_set_context()
> without any locking, writebacks or invalidations. I've added a
> WARN_ON_ONCE() sanity check to make sure that we are notified if we ever
> encounter a case where we are encrypting an inode that already has data,
> in which case we need to add code to safely transition S_DAX.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Looks good to me - and frankly I think we can drop the stable CC here...
Anyway, you can add:
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Honza
> ---
> fs/ext4/super.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
> index 4251e50..c090780 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/super.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
> @@ -1159,6 +1159,9 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
> if (inode->i_ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO)
> return -EPERM;
>
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_DAX(inode) && i_size_read(inode)))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> res = ext4_convert_inline_data(inode);
> if (res)
> return res;
> --
> 2.9.5
>
--
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
SUSE Labs, CR
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-12 6:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-12 5:05 [PATCH v2 0/5] ext4: DAX data corruption fixes Ross Zwisler
[not found] ` <20170912050526.7627-1-ross.zwisler-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-12 5:05 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] ext4: prevent data corruption with inline data + DAX Ross Zwisler
[not found] ` <20170912050526.7627-2-ross.zwisler-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-12 6:38 ` Jan Kara
2017-10-12 15:52 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-12 5:05 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] ext4: prevent data corruption with journaling " Ross Zwisler
2017-09-12 6:41 ` Jan Kara
[not found] ` <20170912050526.7627-3-ross.zwisler-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2017-10-12 15:55 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-12 5:05 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] ext4: add sanity check for encryption " Ross Zwisler
2017-09-12 6:45 ` Jan Kara [this message]
2017-09-12 15:39 ` Ross Zwisler
2017-09-12 5:05 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] ext4: add ext4_should_use_dax() Ross Zwisler
[not found] ` <20170912050526.7627-5-ross.zwisler-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-12 6:46 ` Jan Kara
[not found] ` <20170912064612.GD16554-4I4JzKEfoa/jFM9bn6wA6Q@public.gmane.org>
2017-10-12 16:01 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-12 5:05 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] ext4: remove duplicate extended attributes defs Ross Zwisler
[not found] ` <20170912050526.7627-6-ross.zwisler-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2017-10-12 16:18 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-29 17:37 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] ext4: DAX data corruption fixes Ross Zwisler
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