From: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@belouin.fr>
To: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>, Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@kernel.org>,
Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>,
Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infrad
Cc: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@belouin.fr>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: create CAP_TRUSTED
Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 15:45:57 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171021134558.21195-1-nicolas@belouin.fr> (raw)
with CAP_SYS_ADMIN being bloated, the usefulness of using it to
flag a process to be entrusted for e.g reading and writing trusted
xattr is near zero.
CAP_TRUSTED aims to provide userland with a way to mark a process as
entrusted to do specific (not specially admin-centered) actions. It
would for example allow a process to red/write the trusted xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@belouin.fr>
---
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 5 +++--
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index ce230aa6d928..27e457b93c84 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -369,7 +369,11 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
#define CAP_SYS_MOUNT 38
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_MOUNT
+/* Allow read/write trusted xattr */
+
+#define CAP_TRUSTED 39
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_TRUSTED
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index a873dce97fd5..f5dc8e109f5a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -24,9 +24,10 @@
"audit_control", "setfcap"
#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
- "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_mount"
+ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_mount", \
+ "trusted"
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_MOUNT
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_TRUSTED
#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
#endif
--
2.14.2
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next reply other threads:[~2017-10-21 13:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-21 13:45 Nicolas Belouin [this message]
2017-10-21 13:45 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] fs: Grant CAP_TRUSTED rw access to trusted xattrs Nicolas Belouin
2017-10-21 16:03 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: create CAP_TRUSTED Serge E. Hallyn
2017-10-21 19:09 ` nicolas
2017-10-21 17:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-10-21 19:04 ` nicolas
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