* [PATCH 2/2] ext4: Avoid cycles in directory h-tree
2022-04-28 18:31 [PATCH 0/2] ext4: Fix crash when adding entry to corrupted directory Jan Kara
@ 2022-04-28 18:31 ` Jan Kara
2022-05-17 23:55 ` Theodore Ts'o
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jan Kara @ 2022-04-28 18:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ted Tso; +Cc: linux-ext4, Jan Kara, stable
A maliciously corrupted filesystem can contain cycles in the h-tree
stored inside a directory. That can easily lead to the kernel corrupting
tree nodes that were already verified under its hands while doing a node
split and consequently accessing unallocated memory. Fix the problem by
verifying traversed block numbers are unique.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
---
fs/ext4/namei.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c
index ca6ee9940599..06441ad6104d 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -777,12 +777,14 @@ static struct dx_frame *
dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir,
struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_frame *frame_in)
{
- unsigned count, indirect;
+ unsigned count, indirect, level, i;
struct dx_entry *at, *entries, *p, *q, *m;
struct dx_root *root;
struct dx_frame *frame = frame_in;
struct dx_frame *ret_err = ERR_PTR(ERR_BAD_DX_DIR);
u32 hash;
+ ext4_lblk_t block;
+ ext4_lblk_t blocks[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL];
memset(frame_in, 0, EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL * sizeof(frame_in[0]));
frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, 0, INDEX);
@@ -854,6 +856,8 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir,
}
dxtrace(printk("Look up %x", hash));
+ level = 0;
+ blocks[0] = 0;
while (1) {
count = dx_get_count(entries);
if (!count || count > dx_get_limit(entries)) {
@@ -882,15 +886,27 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir,
dx_get_block(at)));
frame->entries = entries;
frame->at = at;
- if (!indirect--)
+
+ block = dx_get_block(at);
+ for (i = 0; i <= level; i++) {
+ if (blocks[i] == block) {
+ ext4_warning_inode(dir,
+ "dx entry: tree cycle block %u points back to block %u",
+ blocks[level], block);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ blocks[++level] = block;
+ if (level > indirect)
return frame;
frame++;
- frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, dx_get_block(at), INDEX);
+ frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, block, INDEX);
if (IS_ERR(frame->bh)) {
ret_err = (struct dx_frame *) frame->bh;
frame->bh = NULL;
goto fail;
}
+
entries = ((struct dx_node *) frame->bh->b_data)->entries;
if (dx_get_limit(entries) != dx_node_limit(dir)) {
@@ -1278,7 +1294,7 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh,
count++;
cond_resched();
}
- de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize);
+ de = ext4_next_entry(de, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize);
}
return count;
}
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] ext4: Avoid cycles in directory h-tree
2022-04-28 18:31 ` [PATCH 2/2] ext4: Avoid cycles in directory h-tree Jan Kara
@ 2022-05-17 23:55 ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-05-18 9:27 ` Jan Kara
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Theodore Ts'o @ 2022-05-17 23:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Kara; +Cc: linux-ext4, stable
On Thu, Apr 28, 2022 at 08:31:38PM +0200, Jan Kara wrote:
> A maliciously corrupted filesystem can contain cycles in the h-tree
> stored inside a directory. That can easily lead to the kernel corrupting
> tree nodes that were already verified under its hands while doing a node
> split and consequently accessing unallocated memory. Fix the problem by
> verifying traversed block numbers are unique.
>
> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
When I tried applying this patch, I got this crash:
ext4/052 23s ... [19:28:41][ 2.683407] run fstests ext4/052 at 2022-05-17 19:28:41
[ 5.433672] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: dx_probe+0x629/0x630
[ 5.434449] CPU: 0 PID: 2468 Comm: dirstress Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-xfstests-00019-g204e6b4d4cc1 #610
[ 5.435012] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 5.435501] Call Trace:
[ 5.435659] <TASK>
[ 5.435791] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[ 5.436027] panic+0x107/0x28f
[ 5.436221] ? dx_probe+0x629/0x630
[ 5.436430] __stack_chk_fail+0x10/0x10
[ 5.436663] dx_probe+0x629/0x630
[ 5.436869] ext4_dx_add_entry+0x54/0x700
[ 5.437176] ext4_add_entry+0x38d/0x4e0
[ 5.437421] ext4_add_nondir+0x2b/0xc0
[ 5.437647] ext4_symlink+0x1c5/0x390
[ 5.437869] vfs_symlink+0x184/0x220
[ 5.438095] do_symlinkat+0x7a/0x110
[ 5.438313] __x64_sys_symlink+0x38/0x40
[ 5.438548] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 5.438762] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 5.439070] RIP: 0033:0x7f8137109a97
[ 5.439285] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f6 d3 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 58 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d c9 d3 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 5.440374] RSP: 002b:00007ffc514a2428 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000058
[ 5.440820] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000035d4a RCX: 00007f8137109a97
[ 5.441278] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc514a2450 RDI: 00007ffc514a2450
[ 5.441734] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 5.442153] R10: 00007ffc514a21c2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000061a80
[ 5.442571] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc514a2450 R15: 00007ffc514a2c50
[ 5.442989] </TASK>
[ 5.443289] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 5.443517] Rebooting in 5 seconds..
Applying just the first patch series (plus the patch hunk from this
commit needed so that the first patch compiles) does not result in a
crash, so the problem is clearly with this change.
Looking more closely at ext4/052 which tests the large_dir feature,
and then looking at the patch, I suspect the fix which is needed
is:
> + ext4_lblk_t blocks[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL];
needs to be
ext4_lblk_t blocks[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL + 1];
Otherwise on large htree which is 3 levels deep, this
> + blocks[++level] = block;
is going to end up smashing the stack.
Jan, do you agree?
- Ted
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] ext4: Avoid cycles in directory h-tree
2022-05-17 23:55 ` Theodore Ts'o
@ 2022-05-18 9:27 ` Jan Kara
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jan Kara @ 2022-05-18 9:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Theodore Ts'o; +Cc: Jan Kara, linux-ext4, stable
On Tue 17-05-22 19:55:47, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 28, 2022 at 08:31:38PM +0200, Jan Kara wrote:
> > A maliciously corrupted filesystem can contain cycles in the h-tree
> > stored inside a directory. That can easily lead to the kernel corrupting
> > tree nodes that were already verified under its hands while doing a node
> > split and consequently accessing unallocated memory. Fix the problem by
> > verifying traversed block numbers are unique.
> >
> > CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
>
> When I tried applying this patch, I got this crash:
>
> ext4/052 23s ... [19:28:41][ 2.683407] run fstests ext4/052 at 2022-05-17 19:28:41
> [ 5.433672] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: dx_probe+0x629/0x630
> [ 5.434449] CPU: 0 PID: 2468 Comm: dirstress Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-xfstests-00019-g204e6b4d4cc1 #610
> [ 5.435012] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
> [ 5.435501] Call Trace:
> [ 5.435659] <TASK>
> [ 5.435791] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
> [ 5.436027] panic+0x107/0x28f
> [ 5.436221] ? dx_probe+0x629/0x630
> [ 5.436430] __stack_chk_fail+0x10/0x10
> [ 5.436663] dx_probe+0x629/0x630
> [ 5.436869] ext4_dx_add_entry+0x54/0x700
> [ 5.437176] ext4_add_entry+0x38d/0x4e0
> [ 5.437421] ext4_add_nondir+0x2b/0xc0
> [ 5.437647] ext4_symlink+0x1c5/0x390
> [ 5.437869] vfs_symlink+0x184/0x220
> [ 5.438095] do_symlinkat+0x7a/0x110
> [ 5.438313] __x64_sys_symlink+0x38/0x40
> [ 5.438548] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
> [ 5.438762] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> [ 5.439070] RIP: 0033:0x7f8137109a97
> [ 5.439285] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f6 d3 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 58 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d c9 d3 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
> [ 5.440374] RSP: 002b:00007ffc514a2428 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000058
> [ 5.440820] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000035d4a RCX: 00007f8137109a97
> [ 5.441278] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc514a2450 RDI: 00007ffc514a2450
> [ 5.441734] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
> [ 5.442153] R10: 00007ffc514a21c2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000061a80
> [ 5.442571] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc514a2450 R15: 00007ffc514a2c50
> [ 5.442989] </TASK>
> [ 5.443289] Kernel Offset: disabled
> [ 5.443517] Rebooting in 5 seconds..
>
> Applying just the first patch series (plus the patch hunk from this
> commit needed so that the first patch compiles) does not result in a
> crash, so the problem is clearly with this change.
I was wondering why my testing didn't catch this and the reason was that my
test VM had a version of xfstests which had ext4/052 test but somehow the
'tests/ext4/group' file didn't contain that test (and a few other newer
ones) so it didn't get executed. Not sure how that broken group file got
there but anyway it's fixed now and indeed ext4/052 test crashes for me as
well.
> Looking more closely at ext4/052 which tests the large_dir feature,
> and then looking at the patch, I suspect the fix which is needed
> is:
>
> > + ext4_lblk_t blocks[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL];
>
> needs to be
>
> ext4_lblk_t blocks[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL + 1];
>
> Otherwise on large htree which is 3 levels deep, this
>
> > + blocks[++level] = block;
>
> is going to end up smashing the stack.
>
> Jan, do you agree?
Yes, thanks for debugging this! But I'd prefer a fix like:
if (++level > indirect)
return frame;
blocks[level] = block;
because the store of the leaf block into 'blocks' array is just bogus. I'll
send V2 with both the issues fixed.
Honza
--
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
SUSE Labs, CR
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 0/2 v2] ext4: Fix crash when adding entry to corrupted directory
@ 2022-05-18 9:33 Jan Kara
2022-05-18 9:33 ` [PATCH 1/2] ext4: Verify dir block before splitting it Jan Kara
2022-05-18 9:33 ` [PATCH 2/2] ext4: Avoid cycles in directory h-tree Jan Kara
0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jan Kara @ 2022-05-18 9:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ted Tso; +Cc: linux-ext4, Jan Kara
Hello,
two patches in this series try to fix a crash when adding directory entry to a
directory with corrupted h-tree. Since I don't have the filesystem image
causing the crash, I'm not sure what was the cause but the stacktrace suggests
we have corrupted one h-tree node while modifying another one so likely
there was a cycle created in the h-tree. This series checks for it and bails
out early.
Changes since v1:
* Fixed compilation error in the first patch (which got fixed in the second
patch)
* Fixed stack corruption issue with largedir feature
Honza
Previous versions:
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20220428180355.15209-1-jack@suse.cz # v1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] ext4: Verify dir block before splitting it
2022-05-18 9:33 [PATCH 0/2 v2] ext4: Fix crash when adding entry to corrupted directory Jan Kara
@ 2022-05-18 9:33 ` Jan Kara
2022-05-19 2:16 ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-05-18 9:33 ` [PATCH 2/2] ext4: Avoid cycles in directory h-tree Jan Kara
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jan Kara @ 2022-05-18 9:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ted Tso; +Cc: linux-ext4, Jan Kara, stable
Before splitting a directory block verify its directory entries are sane
so that the splitting code does not access memory it should not.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
---
fs/ext4/namei.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c
index 767b4bfe39c3..2a55f23e4524 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -277,9 +277,9 @@ static struct dx_frame *dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname,
struct dx_hash_info *hinfo,
struct dx_frame *frame);
static void dx_release(struct dx_frame *frames);
-static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de,
- unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo,
- struct dx_map_entry map[]);
+static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh,
+ struct dx_hash_info *hinfo,
+ struct dx_map_entry *map_tail);
static void dx_sort_map(struct dx_map_entry *map, unsigned count);
static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_move_dirents(struct inode *dir, char *from,
char *to, struct dx_map_entry *offsets,
@@ -1249,15 +1249,23 @@ static inline int search_dirblock(struct buffer_head *bh,
* Create map of hash values, offsets, and sizes, stored at end of block.
* Returns number of entries mapped.
*/
-static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de,
- unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo,
+static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh,
+ struct dx_hash_info *hinfo,
struct dx_map_entry *map_tail)
{
int count = 0;
- char *base = (char *) de;
+ struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)bh->b_data;
+ unsigned int buflen = bh->b_size;
+ char *base = bh->b_data;
struct dx_hash_info h = *hinfo;
- while ((char *) de < base + blocksize) {
+ if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb))
+ buflen -= sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail);
+
+ while ((char *) de < base + buflen) {
+ if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, base, buflen,
+ ((char *)de) - base))
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
if (de->name_len && de->inode) {
if (ext4_hash_in_dirent(dir))
h.hash = EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de);
@@ -1270,8 +1278,7 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de,
count++;
cond_resched();
}
- /* XXX: do we need to check rec_len == 0 case? -Chris */
- de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize);
+ de = ext4_next_entry(de, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize);
}
return count;
}
@@ -1943,8 +1950,11 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir,
/* create map in the end of data2 block */
map = (struct dx_map_entry *) (data2 + blocksize);
- count = dx_make_map(dir, (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) data1,
- blocksize, hinfo, map);
+ count = dx_make_map(dir, *bh, hinfo, map);
+ if (count < 0) {
+ err = count;
+ goto journal_error;
+ }
map -= count;
dx_sort_map(map, count);
/* Ensure that neither split block is over half full */
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] ext4: Avoid cycles in directory h-tree
2022-05-18 9:33 [PATCH 0/2 v2] ext4: Fix crash when adding entry to corrupted directory Jan Kara
2022-05-18 9:33 ` [PATCH 1/2] ext4: Verify dir block before splitting it Jan Kara
@ 2022-05-18 9:33 ` Jan Kara
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jan Kara @ 2022-05-18 9:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ted Tso; +Cc: linux-ext4, Jan Kara, stable
A maliciously corrupted filesystem can contain cycles in the h-tree
stored inside a directory. That can easily lead to the kernel corrupting
tree nodes that were already verified under its hands while doing a node
split and consequently accessing unallocated memory. Fix the problem by
verifying traversed block numbers are unique.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
---
fs/ext4/namei.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c
index 2a55f23e4524..2ca99f1569c0 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -777,12 +777,14 @@ static struct dx_frame *
dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir,
struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_frame *frame_in)
{
- unsigned count, indirect;
+ unsigned count, indirect, level, i;
struct dx_entry *at, *entries, *p, *q, *m;
struct dx_root *root;
struct dx_frame *frame = frame_in;
struct dx_frame *ret_err = ERR_PTR(ERR_BAD_DX_DIR);
u32 hash;
+ ext4_lblk_t block;
+ ext4_lblk_t blocks[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL];
memset(frame_in, 0, EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL * sizeof(frame_in[0]));
frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, 0, INDEX);
@@ -854,6 +856,8 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir,
}
dxtrace(printk("Look up %x", hash));
+ level = 0;
+ blocks[0] = 0;
while (1) {
count = dx_get_count(entries);
if (!count || count > dx_get_limit(entries)) {
@@ -882,15 +886,27 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir,
dx_get_block(at)));
frame->entries = entries;
frame->at = at;
- if (!indirect--)
+
+ block = dx_get_block(at);
+ for (i = 0; i <= level; i++) {
+ if (blocks[i] == block) {
+ ext4_warning_inode(dir,
+ "dx entry: tree cycle block %u points back to block %u",
+ blocks[level], block);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ if (++level > indirect)
return frame;
+ blocks[level] = block;
frame++;
- frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, dx_get_block(at), INDEX);
+ frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, block, INDEX);
if (IS_ERR(frame->bh)) {
ret_err = (struct dx_frame *) frame->bh;
frame->bh = NULL;
goto fail;
}
+
entries = ((struct dx_node *) frame->bh->b_data)->entries;
if (dx_get_limit(entries) != dx_node_limit(dir)) {
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] ext4: Verify dir block before splitting it
2022-05-18 9:33 ` [PATCH 1/2] ext4: Verify dir block before splitting it Jan Kara
@ 2022-05-19 2:16 ` Theodore Ts'o
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Theodore Ts'o @ 2022-05-19 2:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Kara; +Cc: Theodore Ts'o, stable, linux-ext4
On Wed, 18 May 2022 11:33:28 +0200, Jan Kara wrote:
> Before splitting a directory block verify its directory entries are sane
> so that the splitting code does not access memory it should not.
>
>
Applied, thanks!
[1/2] ext4: Verify dir block before splitting it
commit: dfd094204c1f5bb4b1772bade3769cc92b645f1b
[2/2] ext4: Avoid cycles in directory h-tree
commit: 01db66b58446cd7372c4f29324d270b4cd15157d
Best regards,
--
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
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