From: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
To: brauner@kernel.org
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, jack@suse.cz,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, josef@toxicpanda.com,
linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/4] permission check avoidance during lookup
Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2025 19:00:58 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251106180103.923856-1-mjguzik@gmail.com> (raw)
To quote from patch 1:
<quote>
Vast majority of real-world lookups happen on directories which are
traversable by anyone. Figuring out that this holds for a given inode
can be done when instantiating it or changing permissions, avoiding the
overhead during lookup. Stats below.
A simple microbench of stating /usr/include/linux/fs.h on ext4 in a loop
on Sapphire Rapids (ops/s):
before: 3640352
after: 3797258 (+4%)
</quote>
During a kernel build about 90% of all lookups managed to skip
permission checks in my setup, see the commit message for a breakdown.
WARNING: more testing is needed for correctness, but I'm largely happy
with the state as is.
WARNING: I'm assuming the following bit is applied:
diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c
index 78ea864fa8cd..eaf776cd4175 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -5518,6 +5518,10 @@ struct inode *__ext4_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino,
goto bad_inode;
brelse(iloc.bh);
+ /* Initialize the "no ACL's" state for the simple cases */
+ if (!ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_XATTR) && !ei->i_file_acl)
+ cache_no_acl(inode);
+
unlock_new_inode(inode);
return inode;
Lack of the patch does not affect correctness, but it does make the
patch ineffective for ext4. I did not include it in the posting as other
people promised to sort it out.
Discussion is here with an ack from Jan:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/kn44smk4dgaj5rqmtcfr7ruecixzrik6omur2l2opitn7lbvfm@rm4y24fcfzbz/T/#m30d6cea6be48e95c0d824e98a328fb90c7a5766d
and full thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/kn44smk4dgaj5rqmtcfr7ruecixzrik6omur2l2opitn7lbvfm@rm4y24fcfzbz/T/#t
v2:
- productize
- btrfs and tmpfs support
Mateusz Guzik (4):
fs: speed up path lookup with cheaper MAY_EXEC checks
ext4: opt-in for IOP_MAY_FAST_EXEC
btrfs: opt-in for IOP_MAY_FAST_EXEC
tmpfs: opt-in for IOP_MAY_FAST_EXEC
fs/attr.c | 1 +
fs/btrfs/inode.c | 12 +++++-
fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +
fs/ext4/namei.c | 1 +
fs/namei.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
fs/posix_acl.c | 1 +
fs/xattr.c | 1 +
include/linux/fs.h | 21 +++++++---
mm/shmem.c | 9 +++++
9 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--
2.48.1
next reply other threads:[~2025-11-06 18:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-11-06 18:00 Mateusz Guzik [this message]
2025-11-06 18:00 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] fs: speed up path lookup with cheaper MAY_EXEC checks Mateusz Guzik
2025-11-06 22:45 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-11-06 18:01 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] ext4: opt-in for IOP_MAY_FAST_EXEC Mateusz Guzik
2025-11-06 18:01 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] btrfs: " Mateusz Guzik
2025-11-06 18:01 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] tmpfs: " Mateusz Guzik
2025-11-06 19:34 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] permission check avoidance during lookup Mateusz Guzik
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