From: Aditya Prakash Srivastava <aditya.ansh182@gmail.com>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>,
Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>,
Ritesh Harjani <ritesh.list@gmail.com>,
Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>,
sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Aditya Prakash Srivastava <aditya.ansh182@gmail.com>,
syzbot+0c89d865531d053abb2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: [PATCH v4] ext4: fix kernel BUG in ext4_write_inline_data_end
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 06:20:05 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260609062005.1702-1-aditya.ansh182@gmail.com> (raw)
When the data=journal mount option is used, the ext4_journalled_write_end()
function incorrectly calls ext4_write_inline_data_end() without checking
if the EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA flag is still set on the inode.
If a previous attempt to convert the inline data to an extent failed (e.g.
due to ENOSPC), the EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA flag is cleared, but
the EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA flag remains set. In this scenario, the next
call to ext4_write_begin() will not prepare the inline data xattr for
writing, but ext4_journalled_write_end() will incorrectly attempt to write
to it, triggering a BUG_ON(pos + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size) in
ext4_write_inline_data() since i_inline_size was not expanded.
Additionally, two separate TOCTOU race conditions exist due to concurrent
ext4_page_mkwrite() execution:
1) A concurrent ext4_page_mkwrite() can execute ext4_convert_inline_data()
between write_begin and write_end, clearing the inline flags. Since block
buffers were not allocated in write_begin, this results in a NULL pointer
dereference in the write_end fallback paths because folio_buffers(folio) is
NULL.
2) If ext4_convert_inline_data() clears the flags exactly after the inline
flags checks pass in write_end, but before ext4_write_inline_data_end()
acquires the xattr semaphore, the subsequent check will hit a panic via
BUG_ON(!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)).
Fix these issues completely by:
1) Having write_end functions (ext4_write_end(),
ext4_journalled_write_end(), and ext4_da_do_write_end()) return 0
(VFS retry) if they fall through to the block fallback path and detect
that folio_buffers(folio) is NULL, after safely stopping any active
journal handle (protecting against a NULL handle panic in
ext4_put_nojournal()).
2) Replacing BUG_ON(!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) inside
ext4_write_inline_data_end() with a graceful error path. If the inline flag
is cleared after locking the xattr, we unlock the xattr, release the iloc,
unlock/put the folio, stop the journal, and return 0 to trigger a retry.
Reported-by: syzbot+0c89d865531d053abb2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0c89d865531d053abb2d
Fixes: 3fdcfb668fd7 ("ext4: add journalled write support for inline data")
Signed-off-by: Aditya Prakash Srivastava <aditya.ansh182@gmail.com>
---
v4:
- Address critical TOCTOU race condition (reported by Sashiko AI review):
* Scenario: A buffered write holds the folio lock and evaluates the inline
flags checks in write_end to true. Before it enters or locks the xattr_sem
in ext4_write_inline_data_end(), a concurrent memory-mapped page fault
(ext4_page_mkwrite()) converts the inline data to an extent. This page fault
bypasses the folio lock (since ext4_convert_inline_data() runs lockless),
acquires the xattr_sem, and clears the inline flags. When the buffered write
resumes and enters ext4_write_inline_data_end(), it acquires the xattr_sem
and immediately triggers BUG_ON(!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) causing a
kernel panic.
* Fix: Replace the BUG_ON() with a graceful error-handling retry path that
releases all resources (locks/buffers/folios/journals) and returns 0.
v3:
- Fix journal handle leak and NULL handle crash (reported by Sashiko AI review):
* Scenario 1 (leak): During a delayed allocation write (ext4_da_write_begin),
inline data was prepared and a transaction handle started. If a concurrent
page fault converts the inline data before write_end, ext4_da_write_end()
falls through to ext4_da_do_write_end(). If the fallback check for
!folio_buffers(folio) returns 0 to retry without calling ext4_journal_stop(),
the transaction handle is leaked open-ended, eventually hanging the filesystem.
* Scenario 2 (crash): If we blindly call ext4_journal_stop() on a NULL handle
(e.g., when no transaction was started because we never took the inline path),
__ext4_journal_stop() delegates to ext4_put_nojournal(NULL) which triggers
BUG_ON(ref_cnt == 0), panicking the kernel.
* Fix: Retrieve the active handle in ext4_da_do_write_end() and stop it
if non-NULL. Also explicitly check "if (handle)" before calling
ext4_journal_stop() in ext4_write_end() and ext4_journalled_write_end().
v2:
- Address TOCTOU race condition (reported by Sashiko AI review):
* Scenario: A concurrent ext4_page_mkwrite() converts inline data to extents
and clears the flags between ext4_write_begin() and write_end(). The
write_end function falls through to the block fallback path. Since block
buffers were not allocated in write_begin (because it took the inline path),
folio_buffers(folio) is NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference in
ext4_journalled_zero_new_buffers() or ext4_walk_page_buffers(), or silent
data loss in the standard write path.
* Fix: Have the write_end functions return 0 if folio_buffers(folio) is NULL,
triggering a safe VFS-level retry. On the next write attempt, the inline
flags will be detected as cleared, and blocks/buffers will be properly allocated.
fs/ext4/inline.c | 9 ++++++++-
fs/ext4/inode.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c
index 8045e4ff270c..161136e84661 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/inline.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c
@@ -812,7 +812,14 @@ int ext4_write_inline_data_end(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, unsigned len,
goto out;
}
ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand);
- BUG_ON(!ext4_has_inline_data(inode));
+ if (unlikely(!ext4_has_inline_data(inode))) {
+ ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand);
+ brelse(iloc.bh);
+ folio_unlock(folio);
+ folio_put(folio);
+ ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+ return 0;
+ }
/*
* ei->i_inline_off may have changed since
diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c
index c2c2d6ac7f3d..bc2688e03c19 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -1455,6 +1455,14 @@ static int ext4_write_end(const struct kiocb *iocb,
return ext4_write_inline_data_end(inode, pos, len, copied,
folio);
+ if (unlikely(!folio_buffers(folio))) {
+ folio_unlock(folio);
+ folio_put(folio);
+ if (handle)
+ ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
copied = block_write_end(pos, len, copied, folio);
/*
* it's important to update i_size while still holding folio lock:
@@ -1560,10 +1568,19 @@ static int ext4_journalled_write_end(const struct kiocb *iocb,
BUG_ON(!ext4_handle_valid(handle));
- if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
+ if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode) &&
+ ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA))
return ext4_write_inline_data_end(inode, pos, len, copied,
folio);
+ if (unlikely(!folio_buffers(folio))) {
+ folio_unlock(folio);
+ folio_put(folio);
+ if (handle)
+ ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (unlikely(copied < len) && !folio_test_uptodate(folio)) {
copied = 0;
ext4_journalled_zero_new_buffers(handle, inode, folio,
@@ -3231,7 +3248,10 @@ static int ext4_da_do_write_end(struct address_space *mapping,
if (unlikely(!folio_buffers(folio))) {
folio_unlock(folio);
folio_put(folio);
- return -EIO;
+ handle = ext4_journal_current_handle();
+ if (handle)
+ ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+ return 0;
}
/*
* block_write_end() will mark the inode as dirty with I_DIRTY_PAGES
--
2.47.3
next reply other threads:[~2026-06-09 6:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-09 6:20 Aditya Prakash Srivastava [this message]
2026-06-09 12:46 ` [PATCH v4] ext4: fix kernel BUG in ext4_write_inline_data_end Jan Kara
2026-06-09 13:08 ` Aditya Prakash Srivastava
2026-06-11 12:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
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