From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9B00E3815FB; Wed, 24 Jun 2026 05:06:05 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1782277567; cv=none; b=N+4sLpZb1gti9LmleVhSFzDFA+fxc4OKqCcGClHvxOI3MGq8ebN82adJtC2RLbH+1fAhH/i7US+XM1/IpWpZSud6qNAIMFYwhLjw0KHDZ+VaA6f2DNQ8yY4pFDdKK5qBky0zVOu2qYkkeFB5Lj70lrgHPQzUP+CY9Y8yGJyI7M0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1782277567; c=relaxed/simple; bh=A5hN6c0GQfbbl/WeZ0hce1sNen9tn+svuDMzpl7ISOA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=lfHdsIyo0psxYrYxmsVZV1/GIdGKqCGwjlg+2ipfr4zwGqHRIBOR28mS2mC24EQ062NFpjpNRGodY6eVycskYHbhi9X8Jdaxb8Ak6C4kutEEJ9jkVysXCaEWxgOTnSnE4416QXBRwvPDsI/BW3bpQ4vpSJu8XClUi7mmtJt+nEM= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=deOzfmmE; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="deOzfmmE" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 16E7B1F00A3D; Wed, 24 Jun 2026 05:06:05 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1782277565; bh=Mn6lr6qCjRwiUrSp6jfp28uOZlKSNZU4XGVuJV9dOYg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=deOzfmmEUqdYcKN2dPmZMd6/fcExt4/EhjfALy+7ri425ZGTchaHzk4OzqvrqGg+k MLuz6EshZhYz7N0KtGl6k1DqvgrSaz4/6uynrxAyuWWdKLM4SHRPw1bnAxiN5fKxmv NL0nZUpbGAQ0UIu3HGZswNGC3VU49e3o5sV8Hz/h6PSJ/cGXoYLN134rAwqRsYlgrT yqhaAZm45fbskswrhptzFLZRBD6aRaozUR94JWx9e86AaT7gVikJAIr6vyEiUF93kB KV26bcPITKbb9NJM5He03oSv+m/obJADyAX3IOqZ9m6A/7EKGSj3PlF4KNEpCnjclk 4bUJdBA6JHRow== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig , Theodore Ts'o , Andreas Dilger , Baokun Li , Jan Kara , Ojaswin Mujoo , Ritesh Harjani , Zhang Yi , Jaegeuk Kim , Chao Yu , Eric Biggers Subject: [PATCH 11/16] fscrypt: Replace calls to fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto() Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 22:03:29 -0700 Message-ID: <20260624050334.124606-12-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.54.0 In-Reply-To: <20260624050334.124606-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20260624050334.124606-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Now that fscrypt's file contents en/decryption is always implemented using blk-crypto when the filesystem is block-based, the calls to fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto() in fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c (which contains functions that are called only from block-based filesystems) are equivalent to checking whether the file is an encrypted regular file, i.e. fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(). Use that instead. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c index caf706215621..111ea45732f0 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +++ b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c @@ -225,12 +225,12 @@ static void fscrypt_generate_dun(const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, * @inode: the file's inode * @pos: the first file position (in bytes) in the I/O * @gfp_mask: memory allocation flags - these must be a waiting mask so that * bio_crypt_set_ctx can't fail. * - * If the contents of the file should be encrypted (or decrypted) with inline - * encryption, then assign the appropriate encryption context to the bio. + * If the contents of the file should be encrypted (or decrypted), then assign + * the appropriate encryption context to the bio. * * Normally the bio should be newly allocated (i.e. no pages added yet), as * otherwise fscrypt_mergeable_bio() won't work as intended. * * The encryption context will be freed automatically when the bio is freed. @@ -239,11 +239,11 @@ void fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, gfp_t gfp_mask) { const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci; u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE]; - if (!fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode)) + if (!fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode)) return; ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode); fscrypt_generate_dun(ci, pos, dun); bio_crypt_set_ctx(bio, ci->ci_enc_key.blk_key, dun, gfp_mask); @@ -254,16 +254,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx); * fscrypt_mergeable_bio() - test whether data can be added to a bio * @bio: the bio being built up * @inode: the inode for the next part of the I/O * @pos: the next file position (in bytes) in the I/O * - * When building a bio which may contain data which should undergo inline - * encryption (or decryption) via fscrypt, filesystems should call this function - * to ensure that the resulting bio contains only contiguous data unit numbers. - * This will return false if the next part of the I/O cannot be merged with the - * bio because either the encryption key would be different or the encryption - * data unit numbers would be discontiguous. + * When building a bio which may contain data which should undergo encryption + * (or decryption) via fscrypt, filesystems should call this function to ensure + * that the resulting bio contains only contiguous data unit numbers. This will + * return false if the next part of the I/O cannot be merged with the bio + * because either the encryption key would be different or the encryption data + * unit numbers would be discontiguous. * * fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx() must have already been called on the bio. * * This function isn't required in cases where crypto-mergeability is ensured in * another way, such as I/O targeting only a single file (and thus a single key) @@ -276,11 +276,11 @@ bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode, { const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context; const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci; u64 next_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE]; - if (!!bc != fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode)) + if (!!bc != fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode)) return false; if (!bc) return true; ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode); @@ -334,11 +334,11 @@ bool fscrypt_dio_supported(struct inode *inode) * Key unavailable or couldn't be set up. This edge case isn't * worth worrying about; just report that DIO is unsupported. */ return false; } - return fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode); + return true; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_dio_supported); /** * fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() - limit I/O blocks to avoid discontiguous DUNs @@ -363,11 +363,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_dio_supported); u64 fscrypt_limit_io_blocks(const struct inode *inode, u64 lblk, u64 nr_blocks) { const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci; u32 dun; - if (!fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode)) + if (!fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode)) return nr_blocks; if (nr_blocks <= 1) return nr_blocks; -- 2.54.0