From: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@MIT.EDU>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
eugeneteo@kernel.sg
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] ext2: Avoid printk floods in the face of directory corruption
Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2008 12:30:14 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <48D15AC6.3060608@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080917122556.bfe2ec7d.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Sat, 13 Sep 2008 11:32:50 -0400
> "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@MIT.EDU> wrote:
>
>> From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@MIT.EDU>
>> To: akpm@linux-foundation.org
>> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@MIT.EDU>, Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
>> Subject: [PATCH 3/4] ext2: Avoid printk floods in the face of directory corruption
>> Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2008 11:32:50 -0400
>> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.5.6.1.205.ge2c7.dirty
>>
>> Note: some people thinks this represents a security bug, since it
>> might make the system go away while it is printing a large number of
>> console messages, especially if a serial console is involved. Hence,
>> it has been assigned CVE-2008-3528, but it requires that the attacker
>> either has physical access to your machine to insert a USB disk with a
>> corrupted filesystem image (at which point why not just hit the power
>> button), or is otherwise able to convince the system administrator to
>> mount an arbitrary filesystem image (at which point why not just
>> include a setuid shell or world-writable hard disk device file or some
>> such). Me, I think they're just being silly.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
>> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
>> Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
>
> This patch was purportedly authored by yourself, but I'm going to
> assume that it was authored by Eric.
It was, after some discussion w/ Ted & Andreas.
Also just FWIW I'm also in the "as a security issue this is a bit silly"
camp ;)
Thanks,
-Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-09-17 19:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-09-13 15:32 [PATCH 1/4] ext3: Fix ext3_dx_readdir hash collision handling Theodore Ts'o
2008-09-13 15:32 ` [PATCH 2/4] ext3: truncate block allocated on a failed ext3_write_begin Theodore Ts'o
2008-09-13 15:32 ` [PATCH 3/4] ext2: Avoid printk floods in the face of directory corruption Theodore Ts'o
2008-09-13 15:32 ` [PATCH 4/4] ext3: " Theodore Ts'o
2008-09-18 0:57 ` Eugene Teo
2008-09-17 19:25 ` [PATCH 3/4] ext2: " Andrew Morton
2008-09-17 19:30 ` Eric Sandeen [this message]
2008-09-18 9:46 ` Eugene Teo
2008-09-17 19:22 ` [PATCH 2/4] ext3: truncate block allocated on a failed ext3_write_begin Andrew Morton
2008-09-18 7:03 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2008-09-17 19:19 ` [PATCH 1/4] ext3: Fix ext3_dx_readdir hash collision handling Andrew Morton
2008-10-01 22:37 ` Theodore Tso
2008-10-01 23:33 ` Andrew Morton
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