From: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>, Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@debian.org>,
oss-security@lists.openwall.com, Theodore Tso <tytso@google.com>,
linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [oss-security] CVE Request - Linux kernel (multiple versions) ext2/ext3 filesystem DoS
Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2016 09:41:28 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56FD3718.2090502@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160330204304.GD6207@thunk.org>
On 3/30/16 3:43 PM, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 04:56:11PM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
>> On Mar 29, 2016, at 3:14 PM, Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@debian.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> [dropping MITRE from CC since it's not about the CVE]
>>> [adding ext and Theodore to CC]
>>>
>>> On mar., 2016-03-29 at 19:24 +0200, Hugues ANGUELKOV wrote:
>>>> Hello,
>>>>
>>>> The linux kernel is prone to a Denial of service when mounting specially
>>>> crafted ext2/ext3 (possibly ext4) filesystems. This occurs in the function
>>>> ext4_handle_error who call the panic function on precise circumstance.
>>>
>>> Did you contact the upstream maintainers about this? I'm adding them just in
>>> case they're not already aware of that…
>>>
>>>> This was tested on severals linux kernel version: 3.10, 3.18, 3.19, on
>>>> real hardware and Xen DomU PV & HVM (the crash report attached is from a
>>>> Fedora 3.18 PV DomU), from different distribution release: Ubuntu, CentOS,
>>>> Fedora, Linux Mint, QubesOS.
>>>> This a low security impact bug, because generally only root can mount
>>>> image, however on Desktop (or possibly server?) system configured with
>>>> automount the bug is easily triggable (think of android smartphone? Haven't
>>>> test yet).
>>
>> It seems that the important point here is that the filesystem has
>> "s_errors=EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC" set in the superblock? I don't think
>> the actual corruption that triggered the ext4_error() call is important,
>> since there are any number of other failure cases that could generate
>> a similar error.
>>
>> It seems practical to change s_errors at mount time from EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC
>> to EXT4_ERRORS_RO for filesystems mounted by regular users. The question
>> is whether there is a way for the ext4 code to know this at mount time?
>
> You can mount the file system with "mount -o errors=continue" and this
> will override the default behavior specified in the super block.
>
> I would argue that a Desktop or server system that had automount
> should either (a) mount with -o errors=continue, or (b) force an fsck
> on the file system before mounting it.
>
> So I think this is a particularly meaningless CVE, which is why I have
> zero respect for people who try to make any kind of conclusion based
> on CVE counts. I certainly don't plan to do anything about this.
>
> You might as well complain that since the system ships with a reboot
> command that can be executed by a clueless root user, that this is a
> potential DOS attack scenario deserving of a CVE....
First of all, yes, I have always been extremely skeptical of these
"crafted image" CVEs. However, I'm not sure the "store errors=panic
in the superblock" was particularly well thought out either; it certainly
does make for a tidy little timebomb.
While I really hate to give issues such as this a whole lot more
credibility, I wonder about a higher level control, such as a sysctl,
which could [dis]allow errors=panic at a system-wide level. It could default
to disallowing, and it's trivial to set it in sysctl.conf if you really
want it enabled by default.
In the end, errors=panic is really a debug option; a small hoop-jump to
use it doesn't sound too bad to me.
-Eric
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-31 14:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <f4df42b35dd9a6c8c6851eba66b2b3f1.squirrel@webmail-etu.univ-nantes.fr>
2016-03-29 21:14 ` [oss-security] CVE Request - Linux kernel (multiple versions) ext2/ext3 filesystem DoS Yves-Alexis Perez
2016-03-29 22:56 ` Andreas Dilger
2016-03-30 20:43 ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-03-31 14:41 ` Eric Sandeen [this message]
[not found] ` <56FD3718.2090502-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-31 16:51 ` Theodore Ts'o
[not found] ` <20160330204304.GD6207-AKGzg7BKzIDYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-31 14:53 ` Kurt Seifried
[not found] ` <CANO=Ty1OcZ=ukxttq9A9M9ot78jDPzDmq4y1NGUMAQmSiveH_g-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-31 15:47 ` Andreas Dilger
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