From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=18.9.28.11 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794865207; b=R8/u0lKmPlnovDE70hG3ow4fNWyzcRWU/417RvZWJyJH1Z62pfkT3dIyKYt3nOAON2TH h/N4Eeh62NLqzsX9W9vSdeEv9dnRuqCkj/I2Pj6GkIYEBMw85LrcumsRh+UZ9E+FVrhKc 73dYmxlhLOcWxqelKKKFaMJii6DmXl7i1JYEpkhyojt+Lq5QBPGeaf1MBCFN7WnbXJkz8 X07gCMtjLNmgulrmiZnDhgijF0J8PFawKjgOeKYMhCe0BpgbuJzTqF4wC+r6oATGNU0E+ KPCb9UDp9kB5viDBirtoTC4Qiwg5UOmfwShebqn42F1lBBb0HuZdkEDw85g3+1NYfSg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794865207; h=DMARC-Filter:Received:DKIM-Signature:Received:Date:From:To:Cc: Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version:Content-Type: Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=blfgXIbOe9CLDWymWGfeRse6331aW3AgoqdoPjSZ3Ys=; b=p+F18kwdMS77Ila27gGvsF7+5K9zjWfdosDaGzZ99y82vHMfWrqbUaP1Vjl5vLYHfOEu y+iasTF+erEhpu30RcwCsdViZQjyOfRCF7a7baA/m3B5Z3yopIiiKDV1ao7U7DvEYM3j5 2HCVYv6jaXve+aKv0XBfRe8zSZOjqnCWlV8CaTtOx+ukqkC2LjGjpl9HY4zsOTP7OUpFl YeJSufL/enHYhM8lx+ou2QGk0Akna0ZQSeNwFHvnSUnY9kTuFoyY6j0W/NpBybG3h1snU 3x5v2ynYcWuyWWc85eIx5FKTH8zvgsPq/7TxJLj3A6+E2pNJHX/VK0BCo1B1QIPRHMQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass header.from=mit.edu; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=mit.edu; dkim=pass header.d=mit.edu header.i=@mit.edu header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=outgoing header.b=MlIBBcXs; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=18.9.28.11 Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F1F29606A322 for ; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:40:06 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.2 smtp.subspace.kernel.org F1F29606A322 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=mit.edu Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=mit.edu Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key, unprotected) header.d=mit.edu header.i=@mit.edu header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=outgoing header.b=MlIBBcXs Received: from macsyma.thunk.org (c-73-9-28-129.hsd1.il.comcast.net [73.9.28.129]) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id 6AGLdslR013263 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:39:55 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=mit.edu; s=outgoing; t=1794865196; bh=blfgXIbOe9CLDWymWGfeRse6331aW3AgoqdoPjSZ3Ys=; h=Date:From:Subject:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=MlIBBcXs++B0CmfEY5tzsrnmG0YK9tVG3u5qFebBSppFPavbYLiuOjm12F9NaUfBv IcTSs+huF++/GwhAW4YQtlT2cSpEXhb/ZKSlFTpebKAPTbulSdplbkniIw2hxGeY6C f80hX2YBoOlyQq40PMh6hfyk6Ig0X2ETRxWz5nO+7yq89kW1a8LtoAoCa62mS791pZ 2U3gVKq23bQvoBBB1erXpvRsWRXVUe/36tc94DWuGdL8mQ9JhcUmYwLtpASvAxswgz WbsX+ZxuCM/WgFNxYXzbWlZ2TSokY/ElrDxK9+C6gR5CFnf/6UyL07sShvC1M9Z+sk bXkfud17OL7uA== Received: by macsyma.thunk.org (Postfix, from userid 15806) id B879727ACFA1; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:39:53 -0500 (EST) Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:39:53 -0500 From: "Theodore Tso" To: Ahmed Khan Cc: adilger.kernel@dilger.ca, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [BUG] ext4: NULL pointer dereference in jbd2_journal_file_inode() during inline data conversion Message-ID: References: X-Mailing-List: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Sat, Nov 14, 2026 at 07:43:08PM -0500, Ahmed Khan wrote: > > My name is Ahmed Khan, I am a security researcher from Canada. I > believe I found a bug within the Linux Kernel, specifically, version > 7.3.4 affecting all major distros. I will be candid and state that I > used AI heavily in fuzzing the kernel using "syzkaller".... When you say "syzkaller", are you referring to your own instance of syzkaller, which you may have modified to use AI-directed fuzzing? > This corresponds to syzbot crash ID: > 3eb9083d961b1b97587d103692546ba06797de4e This crash ID doesn't appear to be one which is recognized by https://syzkaller.appspot.com --- which would make sense if it's your own Syzkaller instance. > Please let me know if you would like the standalone C reproducer or > the minimal ext4 disk image attached inline. I have this in a private > repo and would be happy to add you as a project contributor. Yes, please send the standalone C reproducer and minimal crafted ext4 image. That would be most helpful. Note that we don't really consider crashes which require a crafted file system image to trigger to be a security vulnerability, unless the file system corruption is not caught by e2fsck (or triggers a memory pointer bug or other issue in e2fsck). Not running fsck on an untrusted file system before introducing it to the Trusted Computing Base of the linux kernel is roughly equivalent to running "dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mem". Sure, it might crash the system, but that's really a PEBCAK system administrator issue. :-) Regards, - Ted