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From: bugzilla-daemon@bugzilla.kernel.org
To: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [Bug 15875] New: Add options to disable POSIX acl for ext2/ext3/ext4 file systems
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 2010 09:29:12 GMT	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bug-15875-13602@https.bugzilla.kernel.org/> (raw)

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15875

           Summary: Add options to disable POSIX acl for ext2/ext3/ext4
                    file systems
           Product: File System
           Version: 2.5
          Platform: All
        OS/Version: Linux
              Tree: Mainline
            Status: NEW
          Severity: enhancement
          Priority: P1
         Component: ext2
        AssignedTo: fs_ext2@kernel-bugs.osdl.org
        ReportedBy: t.artem@mailcity.com
        Regression: No


VFAT becomes less of an option for many hardware producers and many of them
will be glad to embrace ext2/ext3/ext4 filesystems but they have an inherent
problem, they enforce POSIX ACLs.

So, imagine a situation when Peter who has UID=63555 (he's in a corporate
network and that's his real UID according to LDAP) formats his flash drive
using ext2/ext3/ext4 filesystem, then uses sudo to recursively chown the whole
filesystem for his own possession.

Now, Peter comes to a less savvy Alice who wasn't given root permissions on her
PC and she tries to open Peter's flash stick. Oops, Alice cannot open or read
any file on it. I can come up with ten other different scenarios when ACLs are
superfluous.

Taking this situation into consideration it becomes clear that ACL's for
removable storage is more a hassle than a security feature.

So, I strongly suggest implementing a flag which tells the kernel to disregard
all file/directory permissions on the aforementioned FS's.

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             reply	other threads:[~2010-04-30 17:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-04-29  9:29 bugzilla-daemon [this message]
2010-04-29  9:30 ` [Bug 15875] Add an option to disable file/directory permissions for ext2/ext3/ext4 file systems bugzilla-daemon
2010-04-29  9:47 ` bugzilla-daemon
2010-04-29  9:54 ` bugzilla-daemon
2010-04-29  9:56 ` bugzilla-daemon
2010-04-29 10:16 ` bugzilla-daemon
2010-04-29 11:11 ` bugzilla-daemon
2010-05-06 12:36 ` bugzilla-daemon
2010-05-07  7:09 ` bugzilla-daemon
2010-05-31  7:50 ` [Bug 15875] Add an option to disable file/directory permissions for ACL'ed " bugzilla-daemon
2010-05-31  7:55 ` bugzilla-daemon
2010-07-04 14:25 ` bugzilla-daemon
2010-11-04 12:04 ` bugzilla-daemon
2010-11-04 15:48 ` bugzilla-daemon
2011-08-18 15:03   ` Chris Lee
2010-11-04 15:48 ` [Bug 15875] Add an option to disable file/directory access controls for USB stick-type storage devices bugzilla-daemon
2010-11-09 20:41 ` bugzilla-daemon
2010-12-09 16:50 ` bugzilla-daemon
2011-01-16 18:04 ` bugzilla-daemon

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