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Ts'o" To: Eric Biggers Message-ID: <20190728193012.GH6088@mit.edu> References: <20190726224141.14044-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> <20190726224141.14044-9-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190726224141.14044-9-ebiggers@kernel.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) X-Headers-End: 1hrosH-002Cyz-UQ Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v7 08/16] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS ioctl X-BeenThere: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.21 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Satya Tangirala , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Errors-To: linux-f2fs-devel-bounces@lists.sourceforge.net On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 03:41:33PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > From: Eric Biggers > > Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS. Given a key > specified by 'struct fscrypt_key_specifier' (the same way a key is > specified for the other fscrypt key management ioctls), it returns > status information in a 'struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg'. > > The main motivation for this is that applications need to be able to > check whether an encrypted directory is "unlocked" or not, so that they > can add the key if it is not, and avoid adding the key (which may > involve prompting the user for a passphrase) if it already is. > > It's possible to use some workarounds such as checking whether opening a > regular file fails with ENOKEY, or checking whether the filenames "look > like gibberish" or not. However, no workaround is usable in all cases. > > Like the other key management ioctls, the keyrings syscalls may seem at > first to be a good fit for this. Unfortunately, they are not. Even if > we exposed the keyring ID of the ->s_master_keys keyring and gave > everyone Search permission on it (note: currently the keyrings > permission system would also allow everyone to "invalidate" the keyring > too), the fscrypt keys have an additional state that doesn't map cleanly > to the keyrings API: the secret can be removed, but we can be still > tracking the files that were using the key, and the removal can be > re-attempted or the secret added again. > > After later patches, some applications will also need a way to determine > whether a key was added by the current user vs. by some other user. > Reserved fields are included in fscrypt_get_key_status_arg for this and > other future extensions. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Looks good, feel free to add: Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel