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See http://www.infradead.org/rpr.html X-Headers-End: 1isNdr-00AyOI-Tk Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v6 1/9] block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption X-BeenThere: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.21 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, Kim Boojin , Kuohong Wang , Barani Muthukumaran , linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Errors-To: linux-f2fs-devel-bounces@lists.sourceforge.net > +struct keyslot_manager { > + unsigned int num_slots; > + struct keyslot_mgmt_ll_ops ksm_ll_ops; > + unsigned int crypto_mode_supported[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX]; > + void *ll_priv_data; > + > + /* Protects programming and evicting keys from the device */ > + struct rw_semaphore lock; > + > + /* List of idle slots, with least recently used slot at front */ > + wait_queue_head_t idle_slots_wait_queue; > + struct list_head idle_slots; > + spinlock_t idle_slots_lock; > + > + /* > + * Hash table which maps key hashes to keyslots, so that we can find a > + * key's keyslot in O(1) time rather than O(num_slots). Protected by > + * 'lock'. A cryptographic hash function is used so that timing attacks > + * can't leak information about the raw keys. > + */ > + struct hlist_head *slot_hashtable; > + unsigned int slot_hashtable_size; > + > + /* Per-keyslot data */ > + struct keyslot slots[]; > +}; Is there a rationale for making this structure private? If it was exposed we could embedd it into the containing structure (although the slots would need a dynamic allocation), and instead of the keyslot_manager_private helper, the caller could simply use container_of. > +struct keyslot_manager *keyslot_manager_create(unsigned int num_slots, > + const struct keyslot_mgmt_ll_ops *ksm_ll_ops, > + const unsigned int crypto_mode_supported[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX], > + void *ll_priv_data) .. and then the caller could simply set the ops and the supported modes array directly in the structure, simplifying the interface even further. > +static int find_keyslot(struct keyslot_manager *ksm, > + const struct blk_crypto_key *key) > +{ > + const struct hlist_head *head = hash_bucket_for_key(ksm, key); > + const struct keyslot *slotp; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(slotp, head, hash_node) { > + if (slotp->key.hash == key->hash && > + slotp->key.crypto_mode == key->crypto_mode && > + slotp->key.data_unit_size == key->data_unit_size && > + !crypto_memneq(slotp->key.raw, key->raw, key->size)) > + return slotp - ksm->slots; > + } > + return -ENOKEY; > +} I'd return the actual slot pointer here, as that seems the more natural fit. Then factor the pointer arithmetics into a little helper to make it obvious for those few places that need the actual slot number. Also can you add proper subsystem prefix to the various symbol names? > +void keyslot_manager_get_slot(struct keyslot_manager *ksm, unsigned int slot) > +{ > + if (WARN_ON(slot >= ksm->num_slots)) > + return; > + > + WARN_ON(atomic_inc_return(&ksm->slots[slot].slot_refs) < 2); > +} > + > +/** > + * keyslot_manager_put_slot() - Release a reference to a slot > + * @ksm: The keyslot manager to release the reference from. > + * @slot: The slot to release the reference from. > + * > + * Context: Any context. > + */ > +void keyslot_manager_put_slot(struct keyslot_manager *ksm, unsigned int slot) > +{ > + unsigned long flags; > + > + if (WARN_ON(slot >= ksm->num_slots)) > + return; > + > + if (atomic_dec_and_lock_irqsave(&ksm->slots[slot].slot_refs, > + &ksm->idle_slots_lock, flags)) { > + list_add_tail(&ksm->slots[slot].idle_slot_node, > + &ksm->idle_slots); > + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ksm->idle_slots_lock, flags); > + wake_up(&ksm->idle_slots_wait_queue); > + } > +} How about passing the bio_crypt_ctx structure instead of the not very nicely typed slot index? Also if we merge the files both these helpers should probably just go away and me merged into the 1 or 2 callers that exist. > +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION > + > +#define BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_KEY_SIZE 64 > + > +/** > + * struct blk_crypto_key - an inline encryption key > + * @crypto_mode: encryption algorithm this key is for > + * @data_unit_size: the data unit size for all encryption/decryptions with this > + * key. This is the size in bytes of each individual plaintext and > + * ciphertext. This is always a power of 2. It might be e.g. the > + * filesystem block size or the disk sector size. > + * @data_unit_size_bits: log2 of data_unit_size > + * @size: size of this key in bytes (determined by @crypto_mode) > + * @hash: hash of this key, for keyslot manager use only > + * @raw: the raw bytes of this key. Only the first @size bytes are used. > + * > + * A blk_crypto_key is immutable once created, and many bios can reference it at > + * the same time. It must not be freed until all bios using it have completed. > + */ > +struct blk_crypto_key { > + enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode; > + unsigned int data_unit_size; > + unsigned int data_unit_size_bits; > + unsigned int size; > + unsigned int hash; > + u8 raw[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; > +}; > + > +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */ > +#endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */ I don't think we need any ifdefs around these declarations. _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel