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Tue, 28 Apr 2020 02:46:29 +0000 Received: from gmail.com (unknown [104.132.1.76]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C0F79206D9; Tue, 28 Apr 2020 02:46:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1588041976; bh=5m8r1IGjxlxCRpj6aIK48lhOdzD/MmpN0dyJZAgoIhI=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=Rcz7obW4+GLyHh9wb59v7RqJvV8A87h5PViMuZbVkoMO8FhrrV+5cv0wZ8c6bDviT EXtDtywwaVt0YUWODJzuRJwJxOAW5n4wDKpzAnjQDoZXKZIvmjU/c1QeN5PuEBnUJN R0ND6s1V2Hd1BJngTdPgQ9c0O/E8jNK0MN0AZJ0I= Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 19:46:14 -0700 From: Eric Biggers To: Satya Tangirala Message-ID: <20200428024614.GA251491@gmail.com> References: <20200408035654.247908-1-satyat@google.com> <20200408035654.247908-3-satyat@google.com> <20200422092250.GA12290@infradead.org> <20200428021441.GA52406@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200428021441.GA52406@google.com> X-Headers-End: 1jTGGQ-00H5gc-GH Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v10 02/12] block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption X-BeenThere: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.21 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, Kim Boojin , Kuohong Wang , Barani Muthukumaran , linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, Christoph Hellwig , linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Errors-To: linux-f2fs-devel-bounces@lists.sourceforge.net On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 02:14:41AM +0000, Satya Tangirala wrote: > > > +int blk_ksm_evict_key(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, > > > + const struct blk_crypto_key *key) > > > +{ > > > + struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot; > > > + int err = 0; > > > + > > > + blk_ksm_hw_enter(ksm); > > > + slot = blk_ksm_find_keyslot(ksm, key); > > > + if (!slot) > > > + goto out_unlock; > > > + > > > + if (atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0) { > > > + err = -EBUSY; > > > + goto out_unlock; > > > + } > > > > This check looks racy. > Yes, this could in theory race with blk_ksm_put_slot (e.g. if it's > called while there's still IO in flight/IO that just finished) - But > it's currently only called by fscrypt when a key is being destroyed, > which only happens after all the inodes using that key are evicted, and > no data is in flight, so when this function is called, slot->slot_refs > will be 0. In particular, this function should only be called when the > key isn't being used for IO anymore. I'll add a WARN_ON_ONCE and also > make the assumption clearer. We could also instead make this wait for > the slot_refs to become 0 and then evict the key instead of just > returning -EBUSY as it does now, but I'm not sure if it's really what > we want to do/worth doing right now... Note that we're holding down_write(&ksm->lock) here, which synchronizes with someone getting the keyslot (in particular, incrementing its refcount from 0) because that uses down_read(&ksm->lock). So I don't think there's a race. The behavior is just that if someone tries to evict a key that's still in-use, then we'll correctly fail to evict the key. "Evicting a key that's still in-use" isn't supposed to happen, so printing a warning is a good idea. But I think it needs to be pr_warn_once(), not WARN_ON_ONCE(), because WARN_ON_ONCE() is for kernel bugs only, not userspace bugs. It's theoretically possible for userspace to cause the same key to be used multiple times on the same disk but via different blk_crypto_key's. The keyslot manager will put these in the same keyslot, but there will be a separate eviction attempt for each blk_crypto_key. For example, with fscrypt with -o inlinecrypt and blk-crypto-fallback, userspace could create an encrypted file using FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM and flags == 0, then get its encryption nonce and derive the file's encryption key. Then in another directory, they could set FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM and flags == FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY, and use the other file's encryption key as the *master* key. That would be totally insane for userspace to do. But it's possible, so we can't use WARN_ON_ONCE(). - Eric _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel