From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.3 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,NICE_REPLY_A,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 278ADC433B4 for ; Mon, 17 May 2021 19:37:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0BC9C6128E for ; Mon, 17 May 2021 19:37:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233554AbhEQTjI (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 May 2021 15:39:08 -0400 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:42548 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229755AbhEQTjI (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 May 2021 15:39:08 -0400 IronPort-SDR: QHn/egflCEZbuw3XKfC1blHtfzTaLXW5EbbzB6r8MXxTl2Qzsuauawkvk6d29L7H8hRVMx5N4p a0AIQjMkFKUQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,9987"; a="198601147" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,307,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="198601147" Received: from orsmga004.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.38]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 17 May 2021 12:37:51 -0700 IronPort-SDR: BVPJNKFsktd7PcDl+s9UprigQ8xws9oGyIBl87P1L6ONweQkK9zfNiieUOKEIGfUe6jAK9b20v uK3kJrQz7KcA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,307,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="543817544" Received: from rhweight-mobl2.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.0.2.4]) ([10.212.243.163]) by orsmga004-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 17 May 2021 12:37:51 -0700 Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/12] fpga: sec-mgr: enable secure updates To: Greg KH , Tom Rix Cc: Moritz Fischer , linux-fpga@vger.kernel.org, moritzf@google.com References: <20210517023200.52707-1-mdf@kernel.org> <20210517023200.52707-3-mdf@kernel.org> From: Russ Weight Message-ID: <5d0552ce-d2bd-cca1-006e-8f11991fd378@intel.com> Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 12:37:48 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.7.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Language: en-US Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fpga@vger.kernel.org On 5/16/21 10:32 PM, Greg KH wrote: > On Sun, May 16, 2021 at 07:31:50PM -0700, Moritz Fischer wrote: >> From: Russ Weight >> >> Extend the FPGA Security Manager class driver to >> include an update/filename sysfs node that can be used >> to initiate a secure update. The filename of a secure >> update file (BMC image, FPGA image, Root Entry Hash image, >> or Code Signing Key cancellation image) can be written to >> this sysfs entry to cause a secure update to occur. > Why is userspace responsible for triggering this? Passing a "filename" > into the kernel and having it do something with it is ripe for major > problems, please do not. > I am using the "request_firmware" framework, which accepts a filename and finds the firmware file under /lib/firmware. Is this not an acceptable use for request_firmware? - Russ