Re: [PATCH 4/4] ubifs: Implement new mount option, fscrypt_key_required

Richard Weinberger
2019-03-14T20:54:10Z

Eric,

Am Donnerstag, 14. März 2019, 18:49:14 CET schrieb Eric Biggers:
> Hi Richard,
>
> On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 06:15:59PM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> > Usually fscrypt allows limited access to encrypted files even
> > if no key is available.
> > Encrypted filenames are shown and based on this names users
> > can unlink and move files.
>
> Actually, fscrypt doesn't allow moving files without the key. It would only be
> possible for cross-renames, i.e. renames with the RENAME_EXCHANGE flag. So for
> consistency with regular renames, fscrypt also forbids cross-renames if the key
> for either the source or destination directory is missing.
>
> So the main use case for the ciphertext view is *deleting* files. For example,
> deleting a user's home directory after that user has been removed from the
> system. Or the system freeing up space by deleting cache files from a user who
> isn't currently logged in.

Right, I somehow thought beside of deleting you can do more.

> >
> > This is not always what people expect. The fscrypt_key_required mount
> > option disables this feature.
> > If no key is present all access is denied with the -ENOKEY error code.
>
> The problem with this mount option is that it allows users to create undeletable
> files. So I'm not really convinced yet this is a good change. And though the
> fscrypt_key_required semantics are easier to implement, we'd still have to
> support the existing semantics too, thus increasing the maintenance cost.

The undeletable-file argument is a good point. Thanks for bringing this up.
To get rid of such files root needs to mount without the new mount parameter. ;-\

> >
> > The side benefit of this is that we don't need ->d_revalidate().
> > Not having ->d_revalidate() makes an encrypted ubifs usable
> > as overlayfs upper directory.
> >
>
> It would be preferable if we could get overlayfs to work without providing a
> special mount option.

Yes, but let's see what Al finds in his review.

> > Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> > ---
> > fs/ubifs/crypto.c | 2 +-
> > fs/ubifs/dir.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> > fs/ubifs/super.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> > fs/ubifs/ubifs.h | 1 +
> > 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
>
> Shouldn't readlink() honor the mount option too?

Hmmm, yes. We need to honor it in ->get_link() too.

> > + if (c->fscrypt_key_required && !dir->i_crypt_info)
> > + return -ENOKEY;
> > +
>
> How about returning -ENOKEY when trying to open the directory in the first
> place, rather than allowing getting to readdir()? That would match the behavior
> of regular files.

I'm not sure what the best approach is.
We could also do it in ->permission().

Thanks,
//richard