From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:40340 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2389704AbfGYDkI (ORCPT ); Wed, 24 Jul 2019 23:40:08 -0400 Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 20:39:51 -0700 From: Eric Biggers Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: crypto: keyinfo: Fix a possible null-pointer dereference in derive_key_aes() Message-ID: <20190725033951.GA677@sol.localdomain> References: <20190724100204.2009-1-baijiaju1990@gmail.com> <20190724160711.GB673@sol.localdomain> <3d206c43-994e-6134-3f28-b4a500472760@gmail.com> <9740973d-6e59-e4df-7097-4e5d0da89235@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <9740973d-6e59-e4df-7097-4e5d0da89235@gmail.com> Sender: linux-fscrypt-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Jia-Ju Bai Cc: tytso@mit.edu, jaegeuk@kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 11:33:53AM +0800, Jia-Ju Bai wrote: > Sorry, I forgot to send to Eric, so send it again. > > On 2019/7/25 11:30, Jia-Ju Bai wrote: > > > > > > On 2019/7/25 0:07, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > [+Cc linux-crypto] > > > > > > On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 06:02:04PM +0800, Jia-Ju Bai wrote: > > > > In derive_key_aes(), tfm is assigned to NULL on line 46, and then > > > > crypto_free_skcipher(tfm) is executed. > > > > > > > > crypto_free_skcipher(tfm) > > > > ���� crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm) > > > > �������� return &tfm->base; > > > > > > > > Thus, a possible null-pointer dereference may occur. > > > This analysis is incorrect because only the address &tfm->base is taken. > > > There's no pointer dereference. > > > > > > In fact all the crypto_free_*() functions are no-ops on NULL > > > pointers, and many > > > other callers rely on it.� So there's no bug here. > > > > Thanks for the reply :) > > I admit that "&tfm->base" is not a null-pointer dereference when tfm is > > NULL. > > But I still think crypto_free_skcipher(tfm) can cause security problems > > when tfm is NULL. > > > > Looking at the code: > > > > static inline void crypto_free_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) > > { > > ��� crypto_destroy_tfm(tfm, crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm)); > > } > > > > static inline struct crypto_tfm *crypto_skcipher_tfm( > > ��� struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) > > { > > ��� return &tfm->base; > > } > > > > void crypto_destroy_tfm(void *mem, struct crypto_tfm *tfm) > > { > > ��� struct crypto_alg *alg; > > > > ��� if (unlikely(!mem)) > > ��� ��� return; When the original pointer is NULL, mem == NULL here so crypto_destroy_tfm() is a no-op. > > Besides, I also find that some kernel modules check tfm before calling > > crypto_free_*(), such as: > > > > drivers/crypto/vmx/aes_xts.c: > > ��� if (ctx->fallback) { > > ��� ��� crypto_free_skcipher(ctx->fallback); > > ��� ��� ctx->fallback = NULL; > > ��� } > > > > net/rxrpc/rxkad.c: > > ��� if (conn->cipher) > > ��� ��� crypto_free_skcipher(conn->cipher); > > > > drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c: > > ��� if (ablkctx->aes_generic) > > ��� ��� crypto_free_cipher(ablkctx->aes_generic); > > > > net/mac80211/wep.c: > > ��� if (!IS_ERR(local->wep_tx_tfm)) > > ��� ��� crypto_free_cipher(local->wep_tx_tfm); > > Well, people sometimes do that for kfree() too. But that doesn't mean it's needed, or that it's the preferred style (it's not). - Eric