From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: crypto: keyinfo: Fix a possible null-pointer dereference in derive_key_aes() References: <20190724100204.2009-1-baijiaju1990@gmail.com> <20190724160711.GB673@sol.localdomain> <3d206c43-994e-6134-3f28-b4a500472760@gmail.com> <9740973d-6e59-e4df-7097-4e5d0da89235@gmail.com> <20190725033951.GA677@sol.localdomain> From: Jia-Ju Bai Message-ID: <33ae3693-9792-a793-5e9e-aca845c427a5@gmail.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 11:52:07 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20190725033951.GA677@sol.localdomain> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US To: tytso@mit.edu, jaegeuk@kernel.org, ebiggers@kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On 2019/7/25 11:39, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 11:33:53AM +0800, Jia-Ju Bai wrote: >> Sorry, I forgot to send to Eric, so send it again. >> >> On 2019/7/25 11:30, Jia-Ju Bai wrote: >>> >>> On 2019/7/25 0:07, Eric Biggers wrote: >>>> [+Cc linux-crypto] >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 06:02:04PM +0800, Jia-Ju Bai wrote: >>>>> In derive_key_aes(), tfm is assigned to NULL on line 46, and then >>>>> crypto_free_skcipher(tfm) is executed. >>>>> >>>>> crypto_free_skcipher(tfm) >>>>>      crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm) >>>>>          return &tfm->base; >>>>> >>>>> Thus, a possible null-pointer dereference may occur. >>>> This analysis is incorrect because only the address &tfm->base is taken. >>>> There's no pointer dereference. >>>> >>>> In fact all the crypto_free_*() functions are no-ops on NULL >>>> pointers, and many >>>> other callers rely on it.  So there's no bug here. >>> Thanks for the reply :) >>> I admit that "&tfm->base" is not a null-pointer dereference when tfm is >>> NULL. >>> But I still think crypto_free_skcipher(tfm) can cause security problems >>> when tfm is NULL. >>> >>> Looking at the code: >>> >>> static inline void crypto_free_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) >>> { >>>     crypto_destroy_tfm(tfm, crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm)); >>> } >>> >>> static inline struct crypto_tfm *crypto_skcipher_tfm( >>>     struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) >>> { >>>     return &tfm->base; >>> } >>> >>> void crypto_destroy_tfm(void *mem, struct crypto_tfm *tfm) >>> { >>>     struct crypto_alg *alg; >>> >>>     if (unlikely(!mem)) >>>         return; > When the original pointer is NULL, mem == NULL here so crypto_destroy_tfm() is a > no-op. I overlooked this if statement, thanks for the pointer. > >>> Besides, I also find that some kernel modules check tfm before calling >>> crypto_free_*(), such as: >>> >>> drivers/crypto/vmx/aes_xts.c: >>>     if (ctx->fallback) { >>>         crypto_free_skcipher(ctx->fallback); >>>         ctx->fallback = NULL; >>>     } >>> >>> net/rxrpc/rxkad.c: >>>     if (conn->cipher) >>>         crypto_free_skcipher(conn->cipher); >>> >>> drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c: >>>     if (ablkctx->aes_generic) >>>         crypto_free_cipher(ablkctx->aes_generic); >>> >>> net/mac80211/wep.c: >>>     if (!IS_ERR(local->wep_tx_tfm)) >>>         crypto_free_cipher(local->wep_tx_tfm); >>> > Well, people sometimes do that for kfree() too. But that doesn't mean it's > needed, or that it's the preferred style (it's not). Okay. Best wishes, Jia-Ju Bai