From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-pf1-f196.google.com ([209.85.210.196]:37799 "EHLO mail-pf1-f196.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2389078AbfGYDa6 (ORCPT ); Wed, 24 Jul 2019 23:30:58 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: crypto: keyinfo: Fix a possible null-pointer dereference in derive_key_aes() References: <20190724100204.2009-1-baijiaju1990@gmail.com> <20190724160711.GB673@sol.localdomain> From: Jia-Ju Bai Message-ID: <3d206c43-994e-6134-3f28-b4a500472760@gmail.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 11:30:57 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20190724160711.GB673@sol.localdomain> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US Sender: linux-fscrypt-owner@vger.kernel.org To: tytso@mit.edu, jaegeuk@kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On 2019/7/25 0:07, Eric Biggers wrote: > [+Cc linux-crypto] > > On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 06:02:04PM +0800, Jia-Ju Bai wrote: >> In derive_key_aes(), tfm is assigned to NULL on line 46, and then >> crypto_free_skcipher(tfm) is executed. >> >> crypto_free_skcipher(tfm) >> crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm) >> return &tfm->base; >> >> Thus, a possible null-pointer dereference may occur. > This analysis is incorrect because only the address &tfm->base is taken. > There's no pointer dereference. > > In fact all the crypto_free_*() functions are no-ops on NULL pointers, and many > other callers rely on it. So there's no bug here. Thanks for the reply :) I admit that "&tfm->base" is not a null-pointer dereference when tfm is NULL. But I still think crypto_free_skcipher(tfm) can cause security problems when tfm is NULL. Looking at the code: static inline void crypto_free_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) {     crypto_destroy_tfm(tfm, crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm)); } static inline struct crypto_tfm *crypto_skcipher_tfm(     struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) {     return &tfm->base; } void crypto_destroy_tfm(void *mem, struct crypto_tfm *tfm) {     struct crypto_alg *alg;     if (unlikely(!mem))         return;     alg = tfm->__crt_alg;     if (!tfm->exit && alg->cra_exit)         alg->cra_exit(tfm);     crypto_exit_ops(tfm);     crypto_mod_put(alg);     kzfree(mem); } The function crypto_skcipher_tfm() may return an uninitialized address (&tfm->base) when tfm is NULL. Then crypto_destroy_tfm() uses this problematic address (tfm), which may cause security problems. Besides, I also find that some kernel modules check tfm before calling crypto_free_*(), such as: drivers/crypto/vmx/aes_xts.c:     if (ctx->fallback) {         crypto_free_skcipher(ctx->fallback);         ctx->fallback = NULL;     } net/rxrpc/rxkad.c:     if (conn->cipher)         crypto_free_skcipher(conn->cipher); drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c:     if (ablkctx->aes_generic)         crypto_free_cipher(ablkctx->aes_generic); net/mac80211/wep.c:     if (!IS_ERR(local->wep_tx_tfm))         crypto_free_cipher(local->wep_tx_tfm); Thus, I think it is better to check tfm before calling crypto_free_*(). > > It appears you've sent the same patch for some of these other callers > (https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/?q=%22fix+a+possible+null-pointer%22), but none > are Cc'ed to linux-crypto or another mailing list I'm subscribed to, so I can't > respond to them. But this feedback applies equally to them too. Ah, sorry. I just ran "get_maintainer.pl" for the kernel modules used crypto_free_*(), and forgot to cc to linux-crypto... > > Note also that if there actually were a bug here (which again, there doesn't > appear to be), we'd need to fix it in crypto_free_*(), not in the callers. > I think a possible way is to add a check of tfm in crypto_free_*(), such as: static inline void crypto_free_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) {     if (tfm)         crypto_destroy_tfm(tfm, crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm)); } If you think it is okay, I can send a patch for this. Best wishes, Jia-Ju Bai