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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>,
	corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
	eparis@redhat.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
	dm-devel@redhat.com, audit@vger.kernel.org,
	roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v10 3/17] ipe: add evaluation loop
Date: Sat, 08 Jul 2023 01:36:56 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a7ca7bc6780787ab1e2f0d4b93016700.paul@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1687986571-16823-4-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

On Jun 28, 2023 Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> 
> IPE must have a centralized function to evaluate incoming callers
> against IPE's policy. This iteration of the policy for against the rules
> for that specific caller is known as the evaluation loop.

Can you rewrite that second sentence, it reads a bit awkward and I'm
unclear as to the meaning.

> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
>  security/ipe/Makefile |  1 +
>  security/ipe/eval.c   | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/ipe/eval.h   | 25 ++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 120 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 security/ipe/eval.c
>  create mode 100644 security/ipe/eval.h

...

> diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..59144b2ecdda
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/file.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> +
> +#include "ipe.h"
> +#include "eval.h"
> +#include "hooks.h"

There is no "hooks.h" at this point in the patchset.

In order for 'git bisect' to remain useful (and it can be a very handy
tool), we need to ensure that each point in the patchset compiles
cleanly.

> +#include "policy.h"
> +
> +struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy;
> +
> +/**
> + * evaluate_property - Analyze @ctx against a property.
> + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be evaluated.
> + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the property to be evaluated.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * true	- The current @ctx match the @p
> + * * false	- The current @ctx doesn't match the @p
> + */
> +static bool evaluate_property(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx,
> +			      struct ipe_prop *p)
> +{
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ipe_evaluate_event - Analyze @ctx against the current active policy.
> + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be evaluated.
> + *
> + * This is the loop where all policy evaluation happens against IPE policy.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * 0		- OK
> + * * -EACCES	- @ctx did not pass evaluation.
> + * * !0		- Error
> + */
> +int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
> +{
> +	int rc = 0;
> +	bool match = false;
> +	enum ipe_action_type action;
> +	struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL;
> +	const struct ipe_rule *rule = NULL;
> +	const struct ipe_op_table *rules = NULL;
> +	struct ipe_prop *prop = NULL;
> +
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +
> +	pol = rcu_dereference(ipe_active_policy);
> +	if (!pol) {
> +		rcu_read_unlock();
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (ctx->op == __IPE_OP_INVALID) {
> +		action = pol->parsed->global_default_action;
> +		goto eval;

It looks like you are missing a rcu_read_unlock() in this case.

Also, given how simplistic the evaluation is in this case, why not
just do it here, saving the assignment, jump, etc.?

  if (ctx->op == INVALID) {
    rcu_read_unlock()
    if (global_action == DENY)
      return -EACCES;
    return 0;
  }

> +	}
> +
> +	rules = &pol->parsed->rules[ctx->op];
> +
> +	list_for_each_entry(rule, &rules->rules, next) {
> +		match = true;
> +
> +		list_for_each_entry(prop, &rule->props, next)
> +			match = match && evaluate_property(ctx, prop);

Why not break from this loop once evaluate_property() returns false?

> +
> +		if (match)
> +			break;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (match)
> +		action = rule->action;
> +	else if (rules->default_action != __IPE_ACTION_INVALID)
> +		action = rules->default_action;
> +	else
> +		action = pol->parsed->global_default_action;
> +
> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> +eval:
> +	if (action == __IPE_ACTION_DENY)
> +		rc = -EACCES;
> +
> +	return rc;

This can just be 'return 0;' right?

> +}

--
paul-moore.com

  reply	other threads:[~2023-07-08  5:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-28 21:09 [RFC PATCH v10 00/17] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 01/17] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 1/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <ffd5c67f4a9bf45df0ce95a8fe0932a3.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-13 23:31     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 02/17] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 2/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <b2abfd3883dce682ee911413fea2ec66.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14  4:18     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 03/17] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` Paul Moore [this message]
     [not found]   ` <309cfd62a474a7e93be6a0886a3d5aa8.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 20:28     ` [PATCH RFC v10 3/17] " Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 04/17] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 4/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <cbe877b3905033d2b8c7c92e6d0cad4e.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 21:47     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 05/17] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 5/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <7b0f16fd49fb3490af1018eba986d0e4.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 23:56     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 06/17] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 6/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <80ae988288d2ac277a4429e85524a9bb.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 23:59     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 07/17] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 7/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <fcc5de3f153eb60b5acf799c159e6ec8.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-15  3:26     ` Fan Wu
2023-08-01 19:29       ` Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 08/17] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:37   ` [PATCH RFC v10 8/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <ec09144af7c7109d8b457ceccd50ba7a.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-15  3:57     ` Fan Wu
2023-08-01 19:24       ` Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 09/17] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:37   ` [PATCH RFC v10 9/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <85af33c02638ebb501b40fd0f3785b12.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-15  4:00     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 10/17] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 11/17] dm-verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-07-07 14:53   ` Mike Snitzer
2023-07-12  3:43     ` Fan Wu
2023-07-25 20:43       ` Paul Moore
2023-08-08 22:45         ` Fan Wu
2023-08-08 23:40           ` Alasdair G Kergon
2023-08-09 18:02             ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 12/17] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:37   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 13/17] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 14/17] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 15/17] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 16/17] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 17/17] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu

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